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Casenote
Gantt v. Sentry Insurance: When Can an
Employee be Discharged? Ask the
Legislature.
INTRODUCTION
The employment at will doctrine states that when an employer and
employee enter into an employment relationship with no specified duration,
the employment is presumed to be at will.1 "At will" means that the
employment relationship can be terminated by either the employer or the
employee for any reason or no reason at all.2 The at will doctrine has
gained widespread popularity among employers because it recognizes that
the employer is in the best position to make economically efficient
decisions with respect to maintaining or terminating the relationship.3 At
will employment has allowed employers to remove a worker for unsatis-
1. CAL LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989); see Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 172,
610 P.2d 1330, 1332, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841 (1980) (referring to California Labor Code § 2922 as California's
codification of the common law rule of at will employment); JEFFERY L. LIDDLE, Malicious Termination and
Abusive Discharges: The Beginning of the End of the Employment At Will, EMPLOYEE TERMINATION HANDBOOK
1, 1 (1981) (defining at will employment as an agreement between an employer and employee whereby the
employee may voluntarily leave a job or be terminated by the employer for any reason).
The employment at will doctrine is also known as Wood's Rule after Horace C. Wood, who first
enunciated the doctrine in 1877. See HoRAcE C. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT
§ 134, at 272-73 (1877) (asserting that the American rule (which became known as Wood's Rule) presumes that
an employment for an indefinite period of time is presumed to be at will); infra notes 66-68 and accompanying
text (discussing Wood's contribution to the development of the employment at will doctrine). But see Jay M.
Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 126 (1976) (criticizing
Wood's conclusion that the American case law demonstrated the existence of the employment at will doctrine).
2. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 665, 765 P.2d 373, 376, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 214
(1988) (stating that absent an agreement to rebut the at will presumption, an employee can be discharged with
or without good cause); Jill Susan Goldsmith, Note, Employment-At-Will-Employers May Not Discharge At-Will
Employees for Reasons that Violate Public Policy, 1986 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 161, 161 (1986) (noting that the
traditional American rule is that employers may discharge an at will employee for good cause, no cause or even
a morally wrong cause).
3. See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLuM. L. REV. 1404, 1405-06 (1967) (discussing how the employment at will
doctrine is one of the greatest sources of employer power over employees, because the doctrine allows an
employer to legally threaten discharge if an employee does not obey the employer).
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factory performance at any time to improve workplace efficiency. 4 How-
ever, employees, ever at the whim of their employers, have expressed
disdain toward at will employment.5 In the last ten years, due primhrily
to employee criticism of at will employment, California courts have
developed exceptions to the employment at will doctrine. 6 Indeed, courts
have recognized that private sector employees, unlike union and civil
service employees, are at an unfair advantage in the employment
relationship because of the unequal bargaining power that results from at
will employment.7 Furthermore, since private sector employees are not
protected from wrongful discharge by statute or bargaining agreements,
courts have been encouraged to formulate exceptions to at will
4. See Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441,447 (N.Y. 1982) (Wachtler, J., dissenting) (citing
Report of Committee on Labor and Employment Law, At-Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal,
36 Record of Ass'n. of Bar of the City of N.Y. 170, 188, for the proposition that restricting the employment at
will doctrine creates workplace inefficiency).
5. See Blades, supra note 3, at 1405-06 (noting that the employment at will doctrine tends to make the
employee a docile follower of the employer's wishes, because the employee can be discharged under the doctrine
for balking at an employer's demands); see also Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 665, 765 P.2d
373, 376, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 214 (1988) (stating that without limits on the employment at will doctrine,
employees are subjected to threats of discharge that coerce employees into committing crimes or concealing
wrongdoing); Weiner, 443 N.E.2d at 446 n.7 (noting that at will employment permits arbitrary layoffs that breed
a demoralized work force and create inefficiency by generating a disloyal attitude among workers). See generally
ERzA F. voGEL, JAPAN AS NumBER ONE: LEsSONS FOR AMERICA 131-157 (1979) (discussing how the reality
of job security in Japan compared to the at will status of non-union employees in America results in a happier,
more loyal and more productive Japanese work force).
6. Lawrence C. Levine, Judicial Backpedaling: Putting the Brakes on California's Law of Wrongful
Termination, 20 PAC. LJ. 993, 996-97 (1989). Some exceptions to the employment at will doctrine are the
implied-in-fact contract and covenant of good faith and fair dealing, both of which are contract actions. Id.; see
infra note 88 and accompanying text (briefly discussing the contract exceptions); notes 90-142 and
accompanying text (summarizing the public policy tort exception to the employment at will doctrine).
Two contract exceptions to the employment at will doctrine were created by the courts beginning in the
early 1980s. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (1st Dist.
1981) (establishing the implied in fact promise cause of action of wrongful discharge); Cleary v. American
Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 443, 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728 (1st Dist. 1980) (formulating a wrongful
discharge cause of action based on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing). For a more detailed examination
of the two contract exceptions to the employment at will doctrine, see Brian F. Berger, Note, Defining Public
Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REv. 153, 161-67 (1931); William L. Mauk, Wrongful
Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege, 21 IDAHO L. REv. 202, 214-24, 245-54 (1985);
H. Anthony Miller & R. Wayne Estes, Recent Judicial Limitations on the Right to Discharge: A California
Trilogy, 16 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 65, 83-102 (1932); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful
Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816, 1836-44 (1980) [hereinafter
Protecting Employees].
7. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 40 (1915) (Day and Hughes, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that
employees should be given equal bargaining status with employers); Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 311 & n.4, 320,
171 Cal. Rptr. at 917 & n.4, 921 (noting the unequal bargaining power between employers and employees);
Blades, supra note 3, at 1411-12 (stating that individual workers do not have bargaining power to create
contracts providing that dismissal be for just cause only); see also National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch.
372, sec. 1, 49 Stat. 449 (providing that unequal bargaining power between employees and employers resulted
from employees' lack of full freedom to contract and concentration of employers in large corporations).
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employment.8 This Note will concentrate on the exception most recently
confronted by the California Supreme Court in Gantt v. Sentry Insurance:9
the public policy tort exception."
The public policy exception forbids an employer from dismissing an
employee for performing an act that public policy would advocate or for
refusing to do something that public policy would denounce."' For
example, California has a public policy of discouraging the commission or
solicitation of perjury. 2 Hence, if an employer were to discharge an
employee for testifying truthfully, that employer would have wrongfully
discharged the employee because the discharge would be in contravention
of public policy. 3
Under the public policy exception there has been a great deal of
disagreement between courts over what sources of public policy are
appropriate for stating a wrongful discharge claim.' 4 While statutes and
constitutions are universally accepted sources of public policy, courts are
8. See Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 320-21 & n.6, 321, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 921-22 & n.6, 921 (noting that
union employees constituted less than 28% of the work force in 1973, thus leaving the majority of employees
unprotected from wrongful termination); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 509 (N.J. 1980)
(pointing out that many states have recognized the need to protect non-union employees from the abusive
practices of employers); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Wis. 1983) (stating that by
modifying the employment at will doctrine, state courts have recognized the need to protect workers from
wrongful discharge under circumstances not covered by statute or union agreements); infra notes 70-76 and
accompanying text (reviewing the protections given civil service and union employees from wrongful discharge
and how those protections assisted courts in creating exceptions to at will employment). In 1985, the
employment at will doctrine was thought to affect 70 to 75 million workers in the United States. Mauk, supra
note 6, at 204.
9. I Cal. 4th 1083, 824 P.2d 680, 4.Cal. Rptr. 2d 874 (1992).
10. See Gantt v. Sentry Ins., I Cal. 4th 1083, 1085, 824 P.2d 680, 681, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874, 875 (1992)
(stating that review was granted to determine if the plaintiff had stated a wrongful discharge cause of action
against public policy and whether the cause of action was preempted by the Workers' Compensation Act
(WCA)).
11. Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Inc., 381 S.E.2d 445, 447 (N.C. 1989); Cloutier v. Great At. & Pac. Tea
Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 1144 (N.H. 1981); see Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 174, 610 P.2d
1330, 1334, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 843 (1980) (affirming the existence of the public policy exception in California
and stating that a wrongful discharge action lies where an employee is discharged in contravention of a
fundamental public policy).
12. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 118(a) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that a person who knowingly testifies
falsely under oath will be guilty of perjury); id. § 653f(a) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that every person who
solicits perjury is punishable by imprisonment or fine).
13. See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 189, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (2d
Dist. 1959) (holding that the public policy of discouraging perjury is effectuated if the employee can state a
wrongful discharge cause of action for refusing to commit perjury); infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text
(discussing in detail the holding of Petermann).
14. See Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188, 344 P.2d at 27 (noting that public policy is not subject to
precise definition); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Wis. 1983) (indicating that public
policy is a vague concept). See generally Levine, supra note 6, at 1000-01 (discussing the confusion surrounding
the definition of public policy).
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split on the acceptability of administrative rules, judicial decisions, and
other non-legislative sources of public policy.' 5 Some courts follow a
narrow approach of using strictly legislative sources for public policy. 6
Other courts advocate a broader approach by including non-legislative
sources. 17 Advocates of the broad approach argue that, as declarations of
policy, non-legislative sources of public policy are neither less fundamental
nor less substantial than legislative sources. 8 The broad approach also
ensures that employees are adequately protected from wrongful dis-
charge. 9 On the other hand, the narrow approach is favored by courts
wishing to avoid the dilemma of defining public policy.20 Those favoring
the narrow approach also point out that limiting public policy to legislative
15. See Mauk, supra note 6, at 229 (listing additional public policy sources as including codes of conduct,
ethical principles, and administrative agency rulings). Compare Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp, 417 A.2d
505, 512 (NJ. 1980) (asserting that sources of public policy include legislation, administrative rules, regulations
and judicial decisions) and Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (111. 1981) (stating
that public policy is found in statutes and constitutions, and judicial decisions when the legislature has been
silent) with Brockmeyer, 335 N.W.2d at 840 (holding that public policy must be evidenced by a constitutional
or statutory provision).
16. See Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., Inc., 597 A.2d 28, 33-34 (D.C. 1991) (accepting the public
policy exception only where the employee is discharged for refusing to violate a law); Firestone Textile Co. Div.
v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 732-33 (Ky. 1983) (stating that limiting public policy to statutes and
constitutional provisions will ensure an employer's right to have the wrongful discharge cause of action clearly
defined); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985) (recognizing a narrow public
policy exception where public policy is found only in state and federal statutes carrying criminal penalties):
Brockmeyer, 335 N.W.2d at 840 (Wis. 1983) (holding that public policy must be evidenced by a constitutional
or statutory provision).
17. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1034 (Ariz. 1985) (recognizing that
prior judicial decisions as part of a body of common law are an appropriate source of public policy); Parnar v.
Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982) (noting that judicial decisions are appropriate sources
of public policy); Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878 (accepting judicial decisions as a public policy source); Boyle
v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 877 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that public policy can be found in
the constitution, statutes, judicial decisions and administrative regulations); Cloutier v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea
Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 1145 (N.H. 1981) (approving non-statutory sources of public policy); Pierce, 417 A.2d at
512 (stating that sources such as administrative rules, regulations or decisions are acceptable sources of public
policy); Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 589 (Vt. 1986) (rejecting the holding of some courts that public
policy must be legislatively defined).
18. See Gantt v. Sentry Ins., I Cal. 4th 1083, 1103, 824 P.2d 680, 693, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874, 887 (1992)
(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting) (criticizing the exclusion of non-legislative public policy); Mauk, supra
note 6, at 229 (indicating that public policy can be found in sources other than the Legislature).
19. See Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 877-78 (noting that a broad definition of public policy will help ensure that
employees which will not be forced to choose between losing their job and violating public policy); Parnar, 652
P.2d at 631 (including regulations and judicial decisions as sources of public policy to address the need for job
security by protecting employees from wrongful discharge).
20. See Brockneyer, 335 N.W.2d at 840 (arguing for the narrower approach which excludes non-
legislative sources because public policy determinations are too difficult to make outside of legislative sources).
Public policy has been defined as anything that tends to subvert that sense of security for individual rights,
which any citizen ought to feel is against public policy. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 41 Cal.
2d 567. 575, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (1953) (citing Noble v. City of Palo Alto, 89 Cal. App. 47, 50-51, 264 P. 529,
530-31 (1928)).
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sources strikes a balance between employer, employee and public
interests.2 In particular, limiting public policy to legislative sources gives
employers greater flexibility in personnel decisions because the number of
public policies an employer can violate is limited and easily
ascertainable.22 This limited approach to public policy restricts the
number of allowable bases for termination, thereby safeguarding employees
from termination.' The narrow definition of public policy also provides
society with a stable job market since discharge is discouraged in contrast
to unrestrained at will employment.24
The number and type of employees that will be able to maintain a
wrongful discharge suit under the public policy exception will depend upon
whether a court adopts a narrow or broad approach to public policy
sources.' Indeed, the broad approach offers more employees relief from
wrongful discharge.26
The debate regarding whether definitions of public policy should be
limited to legislative sources or expanded to include non-legislative sources
has been evidenced by the disagreement among the California appellate
courts.27 Recently, however, the Supreme Court of California ended the
debate with its decision in Gantt v. Sentry Insurance." In Gantt, the court
rejected the use of non-legislative sources of public policy for establishing
21. See Gantt, I Cal. 4th at 1095, 824 P.2d at 687-88, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881-82 (advocating that limiting
pubic policy to legislative sources strikes the proper balance between the interests of employers, employees and
the public); Brockmeyer, 335 N.W.2d at 841 (justifying the narrow approach as properly balancing society's
interests in a stable job market and increasing industrial productivity).
22. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1095, 824 P.2d at 687-88, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881-82; Brockmeyer, 335 N.W.2d
at 841.
23. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1095, 824 P.2d at 687-88, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882; Brockmeyer, 335 N.W.2d at
841.
24. See Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1095, 824 P.2d at 687-88, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882 (arguing that the narrow
approach discourages discharge); Brockmeyer, 335 N.W.2d at 841 (stating that limiting the public policy
exception to legislative sources ensures a stable job market).
25. See infra notes 295-318 and accompanying text (discussing the ramifications of the narrow approach
to defining public policy sources on wrongful discharge suits in California).
26. Ua
27. Compare Dabbs v. Cardiopulmonary Management Serv., 188 Cal. App. 3d 1437, 1443,234 Cal. Rptr.
129, 133 (4th Dist. 1987) (noting that the legislature is not the only source for public policy) and Hentzel v.
Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 299-300, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 165-66 (Ist Dist. 1982) (allowing plaintiff to
recover without a statute to establish the public policy existing at the time of the discharge) with Becket v.
Welton Becket & Assoc., 39 Cal. App. 3d 815, 821-22, 114 Cal. Rptr. 531, 534 (2d Dist. 1974) (rejecting a
wrongful discharge claim for lack of a legislatively articulated policy) and Gray v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App.
3d 813, 819, 226 Cal. Rptr. 570, 572 (4th Dist. 1986) (noting that generally a statutory violation must be
involved for a wrongful discharge cause of action to be stated under the public policy exception) and Shapiro
v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 477, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 618 (2d Dist. 1984) (requiring
a statutory violation for plaintiff to recover under the public policy exception).
28. 1 Cal. 4th 1083, 824 P.2d 680, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874 (1992).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 25
a wrongful discharge claim, thereby requiring a statutory or constitutional
basis for public policy. 9
The Gantt court also addressed whether the public policy exception to
at will employment is preempted by statutory remedy schemes. 30 For
instance, if a plaintiff states a wrongful discharge cause of action based on
a public policy expressed in the Fair Employment and Housing Act
(FEHA), employers argue that employees must seek their remedy under the
FEHA.3 Courts, however, differ in their approach to the issue depending
on when the public policy came into existence. For instance, the California
Supreme Court has held that if a right existed prior to 1959, when the
FEHA was enacted, then the wrongful discharge claim based on such a
policy is not preempted.32 Some appellate courts, however, have held that
where the public policy implicated in the cause of action was created by
the FEHA, the wrongful discharge claim will be preempted by the
FEHA.33 In Gantt, the California Supreme Court refrained from deciding
29. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1095, 824 P.2d at 687, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881; see infra notes 226-244 and
accompanying text (discussing Gant's limitation on the public policy exception).
30. See Gantt, I Cal. 4th at 1097-98, 824 P.2d at 689, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 883 (observing that defendant
argued that the public policy exception was preempted by statutory remedies); Shoemaker v. Meyers, 52 Cal.
3d 1, 23, 801 P.2d 1054, 1067-68, 276 Cal. Rptr. 303, 316-17 (1991) (noting that the plaintiff argued that the
public policy exception is not preempted by the exclusive remedy provisions of the WCA); Rojo v. Kliger, 52
Cal. 3d 65, 71, 801 P.2d 373, 375, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 132 (1990) (stating that the defendant argued that the
public policy wrongful discharge cause of action was preempted by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)); see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West Supp. 1993) (providing that
the WCA is to furnish an exclusive remedy for the employee against the employer); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§
12900-12995 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993) (creating an administrative remedy for violations of unlawful
employment practices); infra notes 143-162 and accompanying text (discussing preemption of the public policy
exception by the FEHA); infra notes 164-194 and accompanying text (describing preemption of wrongful
discharge claims by the WCA).
31. See Ficalora v. Lockheed Corp., 193 Cal. App. 3d 489, 492, 238 Cal. Rptr. 360, 361-62 (2d Dist.
1987) (dismissing plaintiff's wrongful discharge cause of action as being preempted by the FEHA because the
public policy foundation for the claim was a FEHA provision); Strauss v. A.L. Randall Co., Inc., 144 Cal. App.
3d 514, 519, 194 Cal. Rptr. 520, 523 (2d Dist. 1983) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim
based on age discrimination as prohibited by the FEHA, because the FEHA provides the exclusive remedy for
age discrimination violations). See generally David Benjamin Oppenheimer & Margaret M. Baumgartner,
Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge: Does the California Fair Employment and Housing Act
Displace Common Law Remedies?, 23 U.S.F. L. REV. 145, 182-91 (1989) (discussing the issue of displacement
of the public policy exception by the FEHA).
32. See Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 82 n.10, 801 P.2d 373, 383 n.10, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 140 n.10
(1990) (noting that the FEHA did not preempt the public policy exception to at will employment where the
FEHA provision was a codification of a common law public policy); see also Fair Employment Practices Act,
1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 121, sec. 1, at 1999-2005 (reenacted as the Fair Employment and Housing Act, 1980 Cal.
Stat. ch. 992, sec. 4, at 3138, 3140-65); infra notes 153-161 and accompanying text (discussing the court's
decision in Rojo).
33. See Ficalora v. Lockheed Corp., 193 Cal. App. 3d 489, 492, 238 Cal. Rptr. 360, 361-62 (2d Dist.
1987) (holding that a wrongful discharge claim based on retaliation for opposing unlawful employment practices
is preempted by the FEHA); Strauss v. A.L. Randall Co., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 514, 519, 194 Cal. Rptr. 520,
1993 / Gantt v. Sentry Insurance
whether the public policy exception is preempted when based on a FEHA
created public policy because the court upheld the plaintiffs cause of
action on alternate grounds.34
As an alternative to FEHA preemption, employers have argued that
injuries caused by a wrongful discharge are to be compensated under
California's Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) as opposed to the civil
tort system.35 Until Gantt, the California Supreme Court had not decided
whether the WCA preempted the public policy exception.3 6 The Gantt
court, in fact, held that the exception is not preempted. 7
This Note examines the California Supreme Court's decision in Gantt
v. Sentry Insurance, and its impact on the public policy exception to the
employment at will doctrine. Part I discusses the legal background of the
employment at will doctrine, the public policy exception to at will
employment and preemption of the public policy exception by the FEHA
and the WCA.38 Part II summarizes the facts of Gantt and reviews the
majority and dissenting opinions.39 Finally, Part III discusses the legal
implications of the court's decision and the unresolved issues in public
policy and wrongful termination cases.'
523 (2d Dist. 1983) (declaring that the FEHA policy of prohibiting age discrimination can not sustain a wrongful
discharge claim because the action is preempted by FEHA); see also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West 1992
and Supp.) (listing unlawful employment practices); id. (providing that age discrimination is an unlawful
employment practice); id. (prohibiting discrimination based on pregnancy); i. (stating that to deny a qualified
employee from taking family leave is an unlawful employment practice).
34. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1086 n.2, 824 P.2d at 681 n.2, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 875 n.2.; see Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d
at 82 & n.10, 801 P.2d at 383 & n.10, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 140 & n.10 (leaving open the question of whether the
reliance on pre-FEHA policies for the public policy exception will preempt the wrongful discharge claim); see
infra notes 319-350 and accompanying text (analyzing how the California Supreme Court should rule on the
issue of FEHA preempting the public policy exception).
35. See Shoemaker v. Meyers, 52 Cal. 3d 1, 10, 801 P.2d 1054, 1058, 276 Cal. Rptr. 303, 307 (1990)
(stating that the defendant argued in demurrer that plaintiff's injuries from wrongful discharge were to be
compensated under the WCA instead of in a civil action).
36. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1098, 824 P.2d at 689-90, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 883-84.
37. 1d&
38. See infra notes 41-195 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 196-290 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 291-349 and accompanying text.
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The employment at will doctrine was created in the United States in
the late 1800's.4 By the turn of the century, Legislatures began to create
exceptions to at will employment because the doctrine allowed employers
to take unfair advantage of employees.4" The statutory exceptions,
however, did not protect all employees, but rather, only those discharged
under a narrow set of circumstances such as race.43 Then, in the late
1950's, courts began to create broader exceptions to the employment at
will doctrine, including the public policy exception.' The public policy
exception allows a plaintiff to recover damages when the discharge was in
violation of a public policy, such as when an employee is fired for refusing
to commit perjury.45
The most important feature of the public policy exception to at will
employment is that the exception is based in tort.46 A tort action in
California, unlike a contract action, has no statutory or judicial limits on
recoverable damages, thus, making tort actions more desirable to
plaintiffs.47 In particular, the plaintiff in a tort action can recover punitive
41. See Feinman, supra note I, at 122-29 (tracing the historical development of the employment at will
doctrine); WOOD, supra note 1, at 272-73 (stating that the American rule presumes that an employment of
indeterminate length is terminable at will); see also infra notes 57-69 and accompanying text (detailing the
evolution of the employment at will doctrine in the United States).
42. See PERRrrT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1.5-1.8, at 15-17 (1992) (explaining how
Congress and state legislatures enacted statutes protecting civil service employees from wrongful discharge and
all employees from class based discrimination); Protecting Employees, supra note 6, at 1817 & n.5 (citing
criticism of at will employment as granting the employer too much discretion in termination decisions which
result in an unfair advantage of the employer over the employee); see also infra notes 70-76 and accompanying
text (discussing the statutory exceptions to the employment at will doctrine).
43. See PERRIT, supra note 42, § 1.5 (noting that only civil service employees were protected by statute
from termination without good cause); id. § 1.8 (explaining that discharge was prohibited by statute if based on
race, religion, sex or national origin); see also infra notes 75-76 (listing statutes preventing discharge under
certain circumstances).
44. See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 188-89, 344 P.2d 25, 27
(2d Dist. 1959) (creating the public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine); see also infra notes
90-142 and accompanying text (tracing the development of the public policy exception); supra note 6 and infra
note 88 (discussing the contract exceptions).
45. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (defining the public policy exception).
46. See Levine, supra note 6, at 1050 (noting that in California the public policy exception to at will
employment is the only wrongful discharge cause of action allowing a plaintiff to recover tort damages which
are often larger than contract damages).
47. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1993) (providing that punitive damages may be awarded
in actions arising from obligations other than contract). Contract damages are also limited to those that are
foreseeable at the time the contract is entered into and which can be proven with certainty. See Hadley v.
Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 150 (1854) (establishing the foreseeability limitation to contract damages); see
also FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.14, at 912 (2d ed. 1990) (stating that damages are not recoverable if the
breaching party had no reason to foresee that the loss would be the probable result of breach); id. § 12.15
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damages4 8 and damages for emotional distress.4 9 This potential for larger
damage awards with the public policy exception has caused many
employers to challenge the exception on the grounds that it is preempted
by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Fair Employment and Housing
Act or Workers' Compensation Act." A logical analysis of the pre-
emption issues requires an understanding of the history and rationale of
both the employment at will doctrine and the public policy exception.
A. Historical Development of the Employment At Will Doctrine
The employment at will doctrine arose in an era of Social Dar-
winism 51 and laissez faire economics s2 where employers and employees
were encouraged to contract freely. 3 From Social Darwinism and laissez
faire principles came the freedom of contract theory that encouraged
(noting that damages are not recoverable for loss unless established with reasonable certainty).
48. Levine, supra note 6, at 1050. Punitive damages are damages awarded against a person to punish for
outrageous conduct and to deter that person and others from similar conduct in the future. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). Punitive damages are often awarded in wrongful discharge claims under the
public policy exception. See, e.g., Rosenkrantz v. Brown Foreman Corp., No. BC 011 337 (L.A. Central May
27, 1992) (awarding plaintiff $225,000 in punitive damages); Chavet v. First Interstate Bank, No. C 647 298
(L.A. Central Dec. 12, 1991) (granting plaintiff $1,000,000 in punitive damages); Wane v. Great W. Fin. Serv.,
Inc, No. C 665 154 (L.A. Central June 28. 1991) (awarding plaintiff $270,000 in punitive damages).
49. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, § 12.17 (stating that damages for emotional distress are rarely
recoverable in contract even if the limits of unforeseeability and uncertainty are overcome). In California, as
compared to the general rule stated by Farnsworth, emotional distress damages are recoverable in contract
actions. See Frazier v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 90, 107, 214 Cal. Rptr. 883, 892-93 (2d
Dist. 1985) (finding that while the plaintiff in a contract action is statutorily barred from punitive damages,
damages for emotional distress are recoverable). Damages for emotional distress are often awarded by juries in
wrongful discharge cases. See, e.g., Rosenkrantz, No. BC 011 337 (L.A. Central May 27, 1992) (awarding
$500,000 for emotional distress); Wane, No. C 665 154 (L.A. Central June 28, 1991) (awarding plaintiff
$239,000 for emotional distress); Kaufman v. Summit Health, Ltd., No. C591 466 (L.A. May 25, 1990) (granting
$2,500,000 for emotional distress). For a thorough discussion of the significant differences between tort and
contract damages in wrongful discharge cases, see generally Levine, supra note 6, at 1050-52 nn.214-219.
50. See Shoemaker v. Meyers, 52 Cal. 3d 1, 23, 801 P.2d 1054, 1067-68, 276 Cal. Rptr. 303, 316-17
(1990) (illustrating a defendant attacking a public policy exception case as being preempted by the Workers'
Compensation Act); Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 91, 801 P.2d 373, 389, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 146 (1990)
(noting that the defendant argued that a wrongful discharge claim was preempted by the FEHA when the public
policy was found in the FEHA); see also infra notes 143-194 accompanying text (addressing the efforts by
employers to preempt the public policy exception with the FEHA and the WCA).
51. See JOHN K. GALERArrH, ECONOMICS IN PERSPECTIVE 57, 121 (1987) (defining Social Darwinism
as a theory advocating that the poor and non-survivors in society were the weaklings and that their demise was
a way of improving society). By eliminating the least developed citizens and maintaining pressure on the
survivors, Social Darwinism maintains that the economy will grow and become more prosperous. Id. at 122.
52. Laissez faire economics stands for the principle that economic markets run most efficiently and
productively when free from government intervention. GALBRAITH, supra note 51, at 51.
53. Feinman, supra note 1, at 118; see PERRITT. supra note 42, § 1.A (indicating that freedom of contract
was desired by employers and employees to maximize the benefit of markets such as wages and profits).
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employers to maximize wealth by negotiating for wage, hour and duration
terms of employment based on the price the producer could receive for the
product.- Yet, the concentration of employers and the increasing numbers
of employees seeking employment led to augmented employer bargaining
power.5  In the late 1800s, the increased power of employers over
employees resulted in unsafe working conditions and no protection against
discrimination. 6 This atmosphere of an employer's latitude in treating
employees poorly was the backdrop for the creation of the employment at
will doctrine.
The American courts originally adopted the English rule regarding
employment duration articulated by Sir William Blackstone in 1765.57
Blackstone's rule presumed that employment agreements with no specified
term were for one year.58 The underlying rationale of the one year rule
was that allowing masters to benefit from servants' labor during the
planting and harvesting season and then discharging them in order to avoid
wages in the unproductive winter was unjust.59 The presumption was also
based on the custom that the master servant relationship was paternal-
istic.' For example, the master provided food, shelter and security for the
54. See PERRrr, supra note 42, § 1.4 (tracing the development of the employment at will doctrine).
55. National Labor Relations Act of 1935 ch. 372, sec. 1, 49 Stat. 449 (explaining why Congress needs
to oversee and provide for equal bargaining between management and labor).
56. Blades, supra note 3, at 1406-09; see American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council,
257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921) (noting that a single worker was helpless, at the turn of the century, in dealing with
an employer because the worker was dependent on the daily wage to maintain his family, and thus was unable
to leave or resist unfair treatment when the employer refused to pay a fair wage); see also VosE,
CONSTITUTIONAL CHAN 163 (1972) (stating that in the 1890's factory conditions were deplorable, city slums
were loathsome and the legal rights of workers in dangerous industries did not exist); GALBRAITH, supra note
51, at96 (noting that poor working conditions led to worker illness and substandard performance). Poor working
conditions in factories resulted in workers' decreasing health and productivity and resulted in employers' need
to fire employees easily to ensure efficient production. Id.
57. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *425; see Davis v. Gorten, 16 N.Y. 255, 256-57 (1857)
(holding that the New York courts apply the English rule of presuming that employment contracts are of a one
year duration); Feinmansupra note 1, at 119-20 (discussing Blackstone's statement of the one year employment
rule in England).
58. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 57, at *425. The one year rule preserves natural equity by requiring the
master to maintain the servant when there is work and when there is not. Id.
59. Feinman, supra note 1, at 120. Sir Blackstone's rationale for the one year rule is known as the
"benefit of the seasons" rationale. Id. at 123. Although the rationale was apparently aimed at agricultural
workers, the presumption of year long hiring applied to all types of servants, except those employed for a single
task. ld. at 120. Feinman explained that where the employment agreement provided for a fixed duration, or
completion of a certain job, the benefit of the seasons rationale was inapplicable and the English courts created
an exception for such employment agreements. Id.
60. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 319-21, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 920-21 (1st Dist.
1981) (citing SELzNiCK, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 123-31 (1969)).
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servant and had general authority to discipline the servant while the
servant had a duty to obey.6'
At the end of the nineteenth century, American courts began to use
contract law to shift away from the English rule.62 The emerging theory
of contract law emphasized negotiating for terms such as hours and wages,
and gave the employer unilateral power to limit its obligations to the
employee. 63 For instance, contract law resulted in an employee's risk of
injury during work to shift from the employer to the employee, since
employers were no longer obligated to provide medical care and thus,
generally refused to do so.64 The notion of freedom to contract also led
American courts to conclude that if the parties to an employment
relationship had intended a one year employment contract, they would
have expressly provided for such a term in their agreement.6"
In 1877, Horace C. Wood, a legal scholar, declared that the
employment at will rule was in fact the law of the United States and that
agreements of an indefinite duration were presumed terminable at the will
61. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *258-66; see Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 319,
171 Cal. Rptr. at 921 (stating that the master had certain responsibilities for the servant's general welfare).
62. See Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1895) (rejecting the English rule presuming
employment for one year, in favor of the employment at will doctrine); Henry v. Pittsburg & L.E.R. Co., 21 A.
157 (Pa. 1891) (holding that an employer can discharge an employee with or without cause); see also PERRrTr,
supra note 42, § 1.10 (discussing the impact of contract law on the demise of the employment at will doctrine).
See generally Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 319-21, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 920-21 (reviewing the history of the
employment at will doctrine); PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUsTIcE 123-31 (1969)
(explaining in detail employment law's shift from master servant law to contract law). For a critical discussion
of why the employment at will doctrine was developed, see Feinman, supra note 1, at 129-35 (rejecting the
theories that freedom of contract or laissez faire economics created the employment at will doctrine and arguing
that the developing capitalist economy of the United States gave rise to at will employment).
63. See SELZNICK, supra note 62, at 131 (stating that at will employment gave the employer unilateral
power to determine the terms of employment); Protecting Employees, supra note 6, at 1824 (discussing the
influence of contracts on the employers' duty to the employees). When production was based in agriculture the
demand for labor was determined by the seasons and weather. PERRITT, supra note 42, § 1.4. Yet, when the
Industrial Revolution moved United States production to an industrial base, prices for supplies and consumer
requirements began to be determined by the demand for labor. Id. Thus, the benefit of the season rationale for
the one year presumption was no longer applicable. Id.; see supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text
(discussing the rationale for the one year presumption).
64. See Protecting Employees, supra note 6, at 1824-25 (noting that the increased use of contract law
reduced the employers' financial obligation to the employee leaving the burden of medical care for work related
injuries on the employee); see also supra note 61 and accompanying text (detailing other obligations of the
master to the servant prior to the advent of contract law).
65. See Protecting Employees, supra note 6, at 1824-25 (stating that the emerging law of contract was
used by courts to reject the English rule). In California, the employment at will doctrine is codified in California
Labor Code § 2922. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989) (stating that when the term of duration is not
expressly made, it is presumed the employment agreement is at will).
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of either party without cause.66 Wood gave no policy reason for his
statement of the law, exposing him to fierce criticism regarding the
accuracy of his conclusion.67 After Wood posited the employment at will
rule, it was adopted in a majority of states where it still is the general rule
for employment agreements of an indefinite duration. 68 After the turn of
the century, however, an increasing recognition of workers' rights caused
at will employment to wane.69
B. The Decline of the Employment At Will Doctrine
In the first half of the twentieth century, the employment at will
doctrine began to erode primarily through statutory enactments."0 At this
time, the growing number of employees and the decline in employment
positions reduced employee bargaining power.7 Employees became con-
cerned about job security which was threatened by at will employment. 2
66. See WOOD, supra note 1, § 134 (stating that an indefinite hiring is presumed at will with the burden
of proof on the employee to prove otherwise).
67. See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1030 (Ariz. 1985) (criticizing
Wood's conclusion as being unsound); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880,
886-87 (Mich. 1980) (criticizing Wood's analysis because the cases Wood cited did not support the presumption
of one year employment); Feinman, supra note i, at 126 (questioning the basis for Wood's rule because of its
lack of policy and legal support).
68. See Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y. 1895) (noting that Wood's rule was
the correct statement of the law and was being widely used in 1895); 1 CHARLES LABATr, MASTER AND
SERvANT, § 159, at 516 (1913) (conceding that the employment at will doctrine was the law in a majority of
states); Feinman, supra note 1, at 118 (noting that the employment at will rule exists in almost every jurisdiction
in the United States).
69. See PERIRITT, supra note 42, §§ 1.7-1.8 (noting that the move to unionize labor and the civil rights
movement led to the erosion of the employment at will doctrine).
70. See generally PERRITr, supra note 42, §§ 1.5-1.9 (indicating the stages in which the employment at
will doctrine had been eroded). The first step in the erosion of the employment at will doctrine occurred when
civil service employees were given protection from dismissal by the Lloyd-LaFollette Act. Id. Next, union
employees gained protection from dismissal by the National Labor Relations Act of 1993, followed by protection
against class-based discrimination by the Unemployment Relief Act of 1935. Id. Finally, common law protection
was given to private sector employees by the Civil Rights Act. Id.
71. See Blades, supra note 3, at 1406-10 (describing examples of the unequal bargaining power between
the employer and employee and the role of the employment at will doctrine in that dichotomy). The increasing
number of employees at the turn of the century gave employers a larger pool of potential workers, thus giving
the employer more power to negotiate favorable terms. Id. at 1404 (quoting FRANK TANNEBAUMI, A PHILOSOPHY
OF LABOR 9 (1951)). The increasing number of employees and analogous concentration of production in
corporations also left employees with little opportunity for self employment. Mauk, supra note 6, at 205-06,
Furthermore, employees could not easily acquire new jobs because termination was starting to be considered a
blot on the employment record. Id. at 205. Particularly, self employment was no longer viable since corporations
had taken over most production and 90% of the work force had become wage or salary earners. Id. at 204.
72. For examples of how the employment at will doctrine threatened employee job security, see Garrity
v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 495 (1967) (discussing how police officers were given an ultimatum of self
incrimination or discharge); Odell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 201 F.2d 123, 124-25 (10th Cir. 1953) (stating
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Addressing these concerns, Congress in 1912 gave federal civil service
employees protection from dismissal without cause under the Lloyd-
LaFollette Act.73 The Act provided that no person in the federal civil
service shall be removed except to promote efficiency.74 Congress also
granted protection for private employees against dismissal based on race,
color or creed." States enacted similar legislation to protect employee
rights and opportunities in seeking and maintaining employment.76
Meanwhile, changes in the United States Supreme Court's
constitutional philosophy increased protection of individual rights in the
employment termination context.77 For instance, in Pickering v. Board of
Education,78 a teacher was dismissed for publishing a letter in the local
newspaper which attacked the school board's handling of a bond issue and
its subsequent resource allocation.79 The Court held that when public
employees exercise their right to free speech on issues of public interest,
they shall not be subject to dismissal based on such activity.80 The public
interest in unhindered speech, a core principle of the First Amendment,
that employees were fired for testifying while under subpoena, against an employer); Mitchell v. Stanolind Pipe
Line Co., 184 F.2d 837, 837 (10th Cir. 1950) (noting that the employee was discharged for bringing an assault
and battery action against a fellow employee); Hardy v. United States, 256 F. 284, 285 (5th Cir. 1919) (stating
that the employee was required by the employer to illegally transport liquor or be discharged).
73. 37 Stat. 414, ch. 350, § 5 (1912).
74. Id.
75. See Unemployment Relief Act, 48 Stat. 22, 23, ch. 17, §§ 1, 2 (1933) (providing that in employing
citizens for the purpose of relieving unemployment under the Act, there shall be no discrimination based on race,
color or creed); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988) (making it unlawful to discharge
an employee because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin); Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1988) (providing that it is unlawful to discharge an employee on the basis of
age); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988) (guaranteeing equal opportunities for handicapped
individuals). See generally PERRMr, supra note 42, § 1.10 (addressing the statutory changes in the workplace
designed to protect employees).
76. While Congress was protecting employees from wrongful discharge, states began outlawing
employment discrimination, thereby limiting the freedom employers had under the employment at will doctrine.
See, e.g., 1965 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 117, sec. 6; 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 121, sec. I at 1999; Del. Laws ch. 19, sec.
711 (1953); 1953 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 249, see. 1; 1946 Mass. Acts ch. 368, see. 4; 1963 Neb. Laws ch. 281,
sec. 4 at 840; 1955 Pa. Laws 744, sec. 5; 1949 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 2181, see. 4; 1962 S.C. Acts sec. 1-360.28.
77. See, e.g., Phelps Didge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941) (holding that Congress has the
power to deny an employer the freedom to discriminate in discharging employees); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 113-14 (1941) (establishing Congress' power to set minimum wage laws). See generally PERRITr,
supra note 42, § 1.10 (discussing the changing philosophy of federal courts in recognizing individual rights);
VOSE, supra note 56, at 163-240 (discussing the change in the United States Supreme Court's constitutional
philosophy regarding workers' rights).
78. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
79. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 566 (1968).
80. Id. at 574; see U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that no person shall be compelled in a criminal case
to testify against himself); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 (rejecting the notion that once individuals become public
employees, they relinquish their First Amendment rights).
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was considered so fundamental a right by the Court that unless the
employee knowingly or recklessly made false statements, the employee
could not be dismissed for speaking."'
These statutory and judicial developments protecting workers' rights
against wrongful termination established a trend favoring employee
rights."2 As a result, state courts became more sensitive to employee
complaints.83 Historically, state and federal courts, using the employment
at will doctrine, had protected employers by upholding employer decisions
to terminate an employee, even if that decision was based on a principle
contrary to public policy. 4 By definition, at will employment provides
that a court is not to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the
parties.8 5 Yet, the public policies inherent in federal and state legislation
forced the judiciary to recognize the legislative intent to protect employee
rights.8 6 In addition, the United States Supreme Court's move to
recognize individual rights reinforced the idea that courts had the power
81. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573-74; see U.S. CONST. amend I (prohibiting Congress from passing a law
that would prohibit the exercise of free speech); see also Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551,
558-59 (1956) (holding that an individual's right to due process of law is violated when a person is dismissed
for asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination). In Slochower, an associate professor at
Brooklyn College was discharged pursuant to a city ordinance for asserting the Fifth Amendment right against
self incrimination. Id. at 552-53. Slochower asserted the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination when
questioned regarding membership in the Communist party before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Id. at 553.
The United States Supreme Court held that Slochower could not be discharged on this basis. Id.
82. See PERRITr, supra note 42, § 1.10 (stating that as courts became more familiar with applying statutes
that protected employee rights, they became more uncomfortable with the harshness of a rule which allowed an
employee to be discharged for no reason, either good or bad).
83. Id.
84. The employment at will doctrine has been the basis for protecting employers from wrongful discharge
cases. See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 175, 180 (Pa. 1974) (affirming the trial court's
dismissal of plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim, where plaintiff was discharged after warning corporate officials
of a dangerous defect in a new product because of the employees' at will status); Simmons v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 311 So. 2d 28, 29, 32 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (granting summary judgment against an at will employee
discharged for allegedly sympathizing with efforts to unionize workers because there was no specified duration
of employment); Shaw v. Kresge Co., 328 N.E.2d 775, 777, 780 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (dismissing employee's
wrongful discharge claim where employee was given no notice of his offenses, contrary to policy stated in the
employee handbook, because the employee was employed at will).
85. See Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y. 1895) (accepting the employment at
will doctrine to avoid substituting the court's judgment for that of the parties to the employment relationship);
see also supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (noting the employment at will doctrine was an attempt to
get away from court imposed presumptions and defer to party intentions).
86. See Mauk, supra note 6, at 204 (noting that courts had historically protected employers); PERRITr,
supra note 42, § 1.10 (stating that the statutory principles in the developing legislation made courts uneasy with
common law rules such as the employment at will doctrine which often prevented employee recovery); see also
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-2(a)-(c) (1988) (prohibiting discrimination by an
employer, employment agency or labor union); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§
621 (1988) (providing that the purpose of the Age Discrimination Act is to promote employment of older
persons and prohibit age discrimination in employment).
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to change the common law.87 Thus, courts began to use their power to
change the common law and found exceptions to the employment at will
doctrine.88 The first judicially created exception to at will employment
was the public policy exception."9
C. The Public Policy Exception to the Employment At Will Doctrine
The public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine
provides that a tort action will arise where the employment relationship is
terminated without good cause and the employer's conduct violates an
established public policy.90 The exception is based on an employer's duty
to implement fundamental public policies as embodied in the state penal
statutes. 91 This duty was implied from the intent of federal and state
statutes that provided redress for employees discharged under limited
87. See Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 628 (Haw. 1982) (asserting that state courts
modified the employment at will rule or found exceptions to the rule after recognizing the plight of private sector
employees who were largely unprotected); see also supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (citing examples
of the United States Supreme Court's expansion of employee rights through the due process clause). For an
example of a court using its power to change the common law to alter at will employment, see Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 176, 610 P.2d 1330, 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 844 (1980) (holding that
the presumption of at will employment can be overcome if the employee is discharged in violation of public
policy); infra notes 90-114 and accompanying text (discussing in detail how the court used common law tort
principles of duty and breach to affirm the public policy exception in California).
88. Courts created exceptions to the employment at will doctrine by using public policy, implied in fact
promises and implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing. See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 188-89, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (2d Dist. 1959) (creating the public policy exception to the
employment at will doctrine); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927
(Ist Dist. 1981) (establishing the implied in fact promise exception to at will employment); Cleary v. American
Airlines, Inc., III Cal. App. 3d 443, 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 727-28 (1st Dist. 1980) (extending the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to employment contracts, thereby creating another exception to the
employment at will doctrine).
The implied in fact promise exception is an action arising where an employer intimates to an employee,
through conduct, that the employer will not terminate the employee without cause. Levine, supra note 6, at 1002.
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied by law into every employment contract and
requires that the employer and employee act in accord with fundamental notions of fairness. Cleary, I I Cal.
App. 3d at 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
89. See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 189-90, 344 P.2d 25, 27-28
(2d Dist. 1959) (allowing an employee to recover when discharged for refusing to commit perjury since perjury
was against public policy).
90. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 176, 610 P.2d 1330, 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 884
(1980); Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 188-89, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (2d Dist.
1959).
91. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 884; see infra notes 111-114 and
accompanying text (explaining why the public policy exception is based on tort).
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circumstances.92 These statutory causes of action, in turn, produced an
expectation of fairness in the work place by prohibiting an employer's
abusive or discriminatory behavior.93 The expectation of fairness, then,
encouraged courts to protect employees beyond the narrow scope of the
statutes, and to recognize an exception to at will employment based on an
employer's duty to refrain from violating fundamental public policies when
discharging an employee.94 The exception also grew from academic
commentary that criticized the at will doctrine as being both arbitrary in
light of statutory limits on discharge and incompatible with the objectives
of a broad range of statutes.95 Today a majority of jurisdictions recognize
the public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine.96
92. See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.. 417 A.2d 505.509 (NJ. 1980) (noting that labor legislation
such as the National Labor Relations Act, demonstrates the governmental agenda of preventing employers from
using the common law right to discharge as a mode of oppression); see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (1988)
(prohibiting discharge based on race, gender, color, religion, or national origin); 28 U.S.C. § 1875(a) (1988)
(prohibiting discharge for service on grand jury); CAL. LAB. CODE § 6310 (West 1989) (prohibiting retaliation
when an employee complains ofhealth and safety problems); id. § 230 (West Supp. 1993) (prohibiting discharge
or discrimination against an employee for taking time off work for jury duty); see also supra notes 75-76 (listing
federal and state statutes providing redress for wrongful discharge).
93. Mauk, supra note 6, at 228.
94. Id; see Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844 (finding that the public
policy exception creates a tort duty to refrain from violating fundamental public policies when discharging an
employee); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text; infra notes 115-133 and accompanying text
(discussing the definition of fundamental public policy).
95. See Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 172 n.7, 610 P.2d at 1333 n.7, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 842 n.7 (noting that the
academic criticism of the employment at will doctrine influenced the adoption of the public policy exception).
96. For a state by state summary, see generally PERRrrr, supra note 42, §§ 1.13-1.63; JOHN C.
McCARTHY, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE, § 1.4, at 2-32 (2d ed. Supp. 1992). States
recognizing the public policy exception are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The District of Columbia also recognizes the public policy exception.
PERtrrr, supra note 42, §§ 1.13-1.63. States rejecting the public policy exception are: Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. Id.
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1. Development of the Public Policy Exception in California
The public policy exception in California was created in Petermann v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters.97 In Petermann, the California
Court of Appeal for the Second District was faced with the issue of
whether an employee could state a cause of action for wrongful discharge
when terminated for refusing to commit perjury at a legislative hearing.98
Perjury and the solicitation of perjury is unlawful under California Penal
Code sections 118 and 653f.99 Thus, Penal Code sections 118 and 653f
declare that the public policy of California is to proscribe perjury."'0 If
an employer were allowed to discharge an employee for refusing to
commit perjury, the court reasoned that the policy of prohibiting perjury
would not be furthered.'' Thus, the court allowed the employee to
recover damages for wrongful termination.102 The court reasoned that to
allow the employer's act to stand without compensating the employee
would be to encourage felonious behavior and would violate the spirit of
the law.0" Therefore, the court established the public policy exception
by finding that an employer's statutory right under Labor Code section
2922, to discharge an at will employee, could be limited by statutory or
public policy considerations." 4 However, the Petermann court never
made clear whether the public policy exception was based in tort or
contract. 105
The California Supreme Court adopted the Petermann rationale in
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Company,"'6 and limited at will employment
by imposing a duty to not violate public policy as evidenced in the
97. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (2d Dist. 1959); see Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335
N.W.2d 834, 838 (Wis. 1983) (stating that Petermann is the leading case for the public policy exception); Pierce
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 510 (NJ. 1980) (citing Petermann with approval in adopting the
public policy exception).
98. Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 187, 344 P.2d at 26.
99. See CAL. PENAl. CODE § 118(a) (West Supp. 1993) (prohibiting perjury while under oath); id §
653f(a) (West Supp. 1993) (forbidding the solicitation of pejury).
100. See Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27 (discussing the policy behind California
Penal Code §§ 118 and 653f).
101. Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 28.
102. Id. at 188-90, 344 P.2d at 28.
103. Id. at 189, 344 P.2d at 27.
104. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27; see CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989) (creating a statutory right for
employers to discharge employees at will where there is no specified term for the duration of the employment).
105. See Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 189, 344 P.2d at 28 (referring to the issue of discharging in good
faith but never stating whether the action is in contract or tort); see also Levine, supra note 6. at 999 (stating
that the court never clarified whether Petermann's cause of action rested in tort or contract).
106. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
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California Penal Code.'0 7 In Tameny, the court decided whether an
employee could recover for wrongful discharge when terminated for
refusing to violate a criminal statute.'0 8 Tameny had been discharged for
refusing to fix prices in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act."t 9 Since
the Tameny case was factually similar to Petermann, the Tameny court had
little difficulty finding that Tameny was wrongfully discharged when fired
for refusing to violate the underlying public policy in a criminal
offense."'
The Tameny court then rejected the defendant's argument that the
public policy exception sounded only in contract."' The court reasoned
that the wrongful discharge action is not based on express or implied
promises, and that the employer has no contractual obligation to avoid
discharging the employee in contravention of public policy." 2 Instead,
the public policy exception, like a tort claim, is intended to protect an
employee from harm arising from the breach of an employer's duty to act
in accord with social policy." 3 Thus, the Tameny court held that the
action entitled the plaintiff to recover tort damages."1
4
After Tameny affirmed the existence of the public policy exception in
California, confusion followed regarding the source and basis of public
107. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). Other
states have also adopted the Petermann rationale. See. e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975)
(finding that the plaintiff could recover compensatory and punitive damages for dismissal for requesting jury
duty); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 388 (Conn. 1985) (allowing tort recovery for an
employee dismissed for protesting noncompliance with labeling requirements); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980) (adopting the public policy exception, yet finding that the employee had
not stated a public policy sufficient for a wrongful discharge cause of action).
108. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 169, 610 P.2d at 1331, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
109. Id. at 170-71, 610 P.2d at 1331-32, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 840-41; see Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1992) (creating a felony for contracting or conspiring to restrain trade or commerce among the states).
110. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 174, 610 P.2d at 1334, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 843. The Tameny court adopted
Petermann's holding that where there is no statute expressly prohibiting the discharge of a worker who refuses
to commit perjury, then the public policy underlying the penal code requires that the employer be barred from
discharging the employee on such grounds. Id. Compare Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal.
App. 2d 184, 187, 344 P.2d 25, 26 (2d Dist. 1959) (stating that plaintiff was employed by defendant union as
a business agent when subpoenaed to testify in a legislative hearing and that plaintiff was fired for refusing to
commit peijury as demanded by defendant) with Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 171, 610 P.2d at 1332, 164 Cal. Rptr.
at 841 (alleging that defendant company threatened plaintiff employee to illegally reduce gasoline prices in
violation of antitrust laws).
I11. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 176, 610 P.2d at 1135, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
112. Id.
113. Id. (quoting PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 613 (4th ed. 1971)).
114. Id. at 174-76, 610 P.2d at 1334-35, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 843-44; see supra notes 46-49 and
accompanying text (discussing the advantages of tort damages compared to contract damages).
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policy. 115 In particular, courts were unsure whether a statutory violation
was required to establish a cause of action,116 whether public policy
could be inferred from statutes, 1" 7 or whether public policy could be
based on non-legislative sources."' In Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty
Advisors,119 the California Court of Appeal for the Second District held
that a cause of action could not be established unless the employee's
discharge was caused by a refusal to perform an illegal act or other
statutory violation. 2 ° However, other courts have stated in dicta that the
public policy exception does not require a legislatively based policy.'
2'
115. See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 188, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (2d
Dist. 1959) (stating that public policy is inherently not subject to precise definition); see also Levine, supra note
6, at 1000-01 (discussing the lower court confusion over the source of public policy); supra notes 27-29 and
accompanying text (noting the disagreement in the California appellate courts regarding appropriate public policy
sources).
116. Courts reasoned that a statutory violation was required for a successful wrongful discharge case since
both Petermann and Tameny dealt with an employer forcing an employee to violate a statute in order to keep
their job. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Petermann); notes 106-110 and
accompanying text (discussing the facts of Tameny).
117. See Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 299-300, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 165-66 (1982)
(holding that in the absence of a statute preventing an employer from discharging an employee for complaining
of unhealthy working conditions, that a public policy promoting a safe work environment can be inferred from
statute).
118. See Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 174, 610 P.2d at 1334, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 843 (finding that the defendant
employer had violated the public policy of the Sherman Antitrust Act in forcing the plaintiff to fix prices);
Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27 (finding that the employer had violated the Penal Code
when suborning the plaintiff to commit perjury); see also Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 295-96,
188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 162 (1st Dist. 1982) (stating that the issue of public policy was not whether the employer
had acted unlawfully but whether the employer had violated a statutory objective). The Tameny court did not
address the definition of public policy as the facts of the case did not require the court to do so. See Tameny,
27 Cal. 3d at 170-71, 174, 610 P.2d at 1331-32, 1334, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 840-41, 843 (alleging that the defendant
instructed the plaintiff to engage in criminal activity by fixing gas prices). The public policy against criminal
activity was enough to give Tameny a cause of action so the court did not have to address the issue of
appropriate sources of public policy. Id. While some courts have required a statutory basis for a public policy,
no California court has required that there be an actual violation of a statute. Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty
Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 477, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 618 (1984).
119. 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984).
120. Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467,477, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 618 (1984);
see Tyco Indus., Inc. v. Superior Court, 164 Cal. App. 3d 148, 159, 211 Cal. Rptr. 540, 546-47 (1985) (noting
that no California case has ever held a public policy sufficient to satisfy the public policy exception without
statutory authority).
121. See Dabbs v. Cardiopulmonary Management Serv., 188 Cal. App. 3d 1437, 1443,234 Cal. Rptr. 129,
133 (4th Dist. 1987) (finding that non-legislative sources of public policy are appropriate, but noting that the
plaintiff had plead a statutory provision); Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1165, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 820, 825 (4th Dist. 1986) (stating that it is immaterial whether public policy is expressed by the Legislature
in statutes or by courts).
For an example of a court finding a cause of action under the public policy exception without a statute
directly establishing a policy, see Hentzel, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 299-300, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 165 (finding that while
no statute prevented discharge of an employee complaining of workplace safety, the plaintiff had stated a cause
of action because such policy was implied in the Labor Code). At the time Hentzel was discharged, Labor Code
§ 6310(a), which prevented discharge for reporting safety or health matters, had not been enacted. Id. Hentzel
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The California Supreme Court unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the
confusion over the appropriate sources of public policy in Foley v.
Interactive Data Corporation.
122
2. Foley v. Interactive Data Corporation: Changing the Focus of
the Public Policy Exception in California
In Foley v. Interactive Data Corporation,123 the California Supreme
Court for the first time was presented with the issue of appropriate public
policy sources. 24 In Foley, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant
corporation for seven years when he was discharged for no express
reason.'2 Shortly before being discharged, Foley had informed his
former supervisor that he was concerned about his new supervisor,
Kuhne.126 Foley told his former supervisor that Kuhne was under
investigation for embezzlement. 2 7 Foley was then discharged shortly
after Foley's former supervisor told him to forget about what he had
heard. 128 Thus, the court was confronted with the issue of whether
Interactive Data Corporation had wrongfully discharged Foley in violation
of a duty, imposed by public policy, on employees to report relevant
business information to management.2 9  The court also considered
whether a cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing existed in the employment context. 30
Instead of creating a bright line rule regarding appropriate public policy
sources, the California Supreme Court established guidelines to direct
lower courts in ascertaining public policy.' First, the Foley court
required that a plaintiff establish that the public policy violated be a matter
affecting society at large rather than being a purely personal or proprietary
was discharged for attempting to secure a smoke free work environment. Id. at 293, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
122. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 668-72, 765 P.2d 373, 378-80, 254 Cal. Rptr.
211, 216-18 (1988) (establishing guidelines to assist in defining public policy).
123. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
124. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 668-72, 765 P.2d at 378-80, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 216-18. See generally Levine,
supra note 6, at 1012-14, 1027-32 (discussing the opinion in Foley and the public policy exception).
125. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 663-64, 765 P.2d at 375, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
126. Id at 664, 765 P.2d at 375, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
127. Id.
128. ld. Foley informed his supervisor of Kuhne's investigation because the defendant company did
business with the financial community. Id
129. Id. at 669, 765 P.2d at 379, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
130. Id at 683-84, 765 P.2d at 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227. See supra notes 6 and 88 and accompanying
text (defining a cause of action for the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
131. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 668-72, 765 P.2d at 378-80, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 216-18.
1993 / Gantt v. Sentry Insurance
interest. 32 In the case of a statutory violation, the court explained that
if the statute regulates conduct between private individuals and does not
implicate fundamental public concerns, the plaintiff has no cause of
action. 3 3 Second, the court stated that the public policy implicated must
be fundamental, substantial and well established at the time of the
employee's discharge.'34 However, the court never addressed what
sources of public policy were appropriate. 135  In particular, the Foley
court did not address the lower court debate on whether non-legislative
sources were acceptable sources of public policy.1 36 Thus, Foley
apparently shifted the focus of the public policy question from the source
of public policy toward an evaluation of the policy's importance and
public character.
37
After Foley, the public policy exception took on more importance
because the exception became the only action entitling a plaintiff to tort
damages. 138 In particular, the court held that an employee can state a
132. Id. at 668-70, 765 P.2d at 378-79, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 216-17. In Foley, the court gave no indication
of what types of statutes protected purely private interests compared to those interests affecting the public. Id.
at 669, 765 P.2d at 379, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 217. But see Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 91, 801 P.2d 373, 389,
276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 146 (1990) (suggesting that prohibitions against sex discrimination, which involve the private
employer-employee relationship, are an appropriate foundation for a wrongful discharge cause of action based
on the public policy exception).
133. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 670-71, 765 P.2d at 379-80, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 217-18. But see PERRrrr, supra
note 42, § 5.12 (noting that drawing distinctions between public and private interests is difficult and often
unprincipled).
134. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 668-70, 765 P.2d at 378-79, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 216-17.
135. Id. at 669, 765 P.2d at 379, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 217. The court declined to decide if non-legislative
sources of public policy were acceptable for establishing a public policy cause of action. Id. However, the court
suggested in footnotes that an analogy can be drawn between the public policy exception and illegal contracts
to create a new test for determining public policy sources. Id at 667, 670, nn.7 & 12, 765 P.2d at 377-78, 380,
rm.7 & 12, 254 Cal. Rptr. 215-16, 218, nn.7 & 12. The analogy implies that if an employer could legally
contract for the employee to perform a certain act, or refrain from performing a certain act, then the contract and
the ultimate discharge would not violate public policy. Id. Jung and Harkness argue that this analogy between
illegal contracts and the public policy exception would lead to a restriction of the exception by limiting the
number of situations where a discharged employee could recover. See David J. Jung & Richard Harkness, Life
After Foley: The Future of Wrongful Discharge Litigation, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 131, 137-38 (1988) (discussing
Foley and the public policy exception).
136. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 669, 765 P.2d at 379, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 271; see supra notes 14-29 and 115-121
and accompanying text (discussing the debate surrounding public policy sources).
137. See Levine, supra note 6, at 1027-28 (noting the change in focus on the question of public policy).
138. Prior to Foley, the wrongful discharge claim based on the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing was a tort and contract action. Miller & Estes, supra note 6, at 83. However, Foley rejected the lower
court holdings that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was a tort action, thereby leaving the
public policy exception as the only cause of action that entitles a plaintiff to tort damages such as emotional
distress and punitive damages. Id.; see Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35
(rejecting tort recovery for the covenant of good faith and fair dealing); see also supra notes 46-49 and
accompanying text (discussing why tort damages are often larger than contract damages in wrongful termination
claims).
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wrongful discharge claim for a breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing,'39 but that such a breach gives rise to contract damages
only. 40 Therefore, a plaintiff seeking tort damages became limited to
bringing an action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.'4
After Foley, commentators predicted that employees would state more
wrongful discharge causes of action 'under the public policy exception to
receive tort damages.'42 As a result of the new appeal of the public
policy exception, employers feared defending more actions under the
public policy exception and attacked the exception as being preempted by
statutory remedy schemes, such as the Fair Employment and Housing Act
(FEHA) and the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA).
t43
3. Fair Employment and Housing Act Preemption of the Public
Policy Exception
The potential for greater employer liability with the public policy
exception to at will employment has led employers to argue that the
exception is preempted by the Fair Employment and Housing Act
(FEHA).144 In pertinent part, the FEHA provides for an administrative
remedy, 45 to be enforced by the Department of Fair Employment and
Housing (DFEH), for violations of the right to be free from employment
139. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (defining the wrongful discharge claim based on the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
140. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 700, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
141. Levine, supra note 6, at 1050.
142. See Levine, supra note 6, at 1050 (stating that the central effect of Foley will be to prevent
wrongfully discharged employees from recovering tort damages, unless the action is based on the public policy
exception); Joseph Posner, Yes, There is Life After Foley, 18 Sw. U. L. REV. 357, 357, 361-62 (1989) (asserting
that while Foley has diminished tort damages for the covenant of good faith and fair dealing action, Foley has
made recovery on other theories, such as the public policy exception, easier); see also supra notes 48-49 (listing
recent verdicts for wrongful discharge under the public policy exception).
143. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text (introducing the issue of FEHA preemption); infra
notes 164-194 and accompanying text (discussing the WCA and preemption of the public policy exception). See
generally Oppenheimer & Baumgartner, supra note 31 (discussing how the FEHA can preempt a wrongful
discharge claim).
144. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900, 12920 (West 1992) (recognizing the Department of Fair
Employment and Housing, whose function is to investigate and seek redress of alleged discrimination); see also
Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 71, 829 801 P.2d 373, 375, 383, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 132, 140 (1990) (stating that
the defendant moved for summary judgment because the cause of action was preempted by the FEHA). But see
id at 82 n.10, 801 P.2d at 383 n.10, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 140 n.10 (noting that the holding does not address whether
wrongful discharge based on retaliation or age discrimination will be affected).
145. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12970 (West Supp. 1993) (providing that remedies for unlawful employment
practices include, but are not limited to, reinstatement with or without backpay, payment of actual damages,
prospective relief to prevent the recurrence of the unlawful practice, emotional distress damages not to exceed
$50,000).
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discrimination. 14 6 The FEHA requires that an individual satisfy the pre-
scribed administrative remedies by filing a complaint with the DFEH,
before any civil action can be brought. 47 If the DFEH decides not to
pursue an action against the employer, the individual must receive a "right
to sue" letter from DFEH before proceeding with a civil suit against the
employer. 148 Because the FEHA creates a statutory scheme to remedy
employment discrimination the question arises, does the FEHA preempt the
common law causes of action for wrongful discharge based on the public
policy exception?149
In California, courts have stated that if a right is created by statute, and
a statutory remedy is provided for violation of that right, the remedy is
exclusive for that right. 50 Applying this "new right-exclusive remedy"
rule to the public policy exception, lower courts have held that a wrongful
discharge cause of action is preempted by the FEHA if the public policy
violated is based on a FEHA provision that did not exist at common
law.5 1 On the other hand, where the right was established prior to the
146. See id. § 12921 (West Supp. 1993) (establishing a civil right to be free from job discrimination); id.
§§ 12901, 12920 (West 1992) (recognizing the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) whose
function it is to investigate and seek redress for alleged discrimination); see also id. §§ 12960, 12963, 12963.7
(West 1992) (providing for a complaint process through which the DFEH is to investigate claims determine the
validity of claims, and try to resolve the matter in confidence).
147. See id. § 12965(b) (West Supp. 1993) (allowing an individual to bring a civil suit only after the
DFEH has failed or refused to pursue the allegation). For a detailed discussion of the FEHA remedy procedures,
see Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 83-85, 801 P.2d at 383-84, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 140-41.
148. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12965(b) (West Supp. 1993). The "right to sue" letter gives the employee the
right to sue the employer under the FEHA in a civil court. Id. The letter must be issued within 150 days from
the filing of the complaint. Id.
149. Oppenheimer & Baumgartner, supra note 31, at 158; see supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text
(introducing the issue of preemption of the public policy exception by the FEHA).
150. Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 234 Cal. App. 3d 612, 636,265 Cal. Rptr. 814, 828 (3d Dist. 1990) superseded
by Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 1 Cal. 4th 1083, 824 P.2d 680, 4 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1992). Where a new right is created
by statute the injured party must utilize the statutory remedy if one is provided. Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 79, 801 P.2d
at 381, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 138; Ficalora v. Lockheed Corp., 193 Cal. App. 3d 489, 491, 238 Cal. Rptr. 360, 361
(2d Dist. 1987); Strauss v. A.L. Randall Co., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 514, 518, 194 Cal. Rptr. 520, 523 (2d Dist.
1983).
151. See Ficalora, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 492,238 Cal. Rptr. at 361 (finding that a wrongful discharge claim
was preempted by the FEHA when the plaintiff alleged that the discharge was in violation of the FEHA's
prohibition against retaliation); Strauss, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 519, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 523 (holding that a wrongful
discharge cause of action based on FEHA public policy prohibiting age discrimination is preempted by the
FEHA because the public policy was created by the FEHA); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(0 (West Supp. 1993)
(stating that it is unlawful to discharge an employee in retaliation for opposing unlawful employment practices);
id. § 12941 (West 1992) (prohibiting discharge based on age); id. § 12970(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993) (limiting
actual damages to $50,000); id. § 12970(e) (West Supp. 1993) (limiting the civil penalty to $25,000); see also
Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 79, 801 P.2d at 381, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 138 (referring to the theory of the California District
Court of Appeal for the Second District as the "new right-exclusive remedy" rule). The effect of preemption is
that the plaintiff no longer has a civil cause of action and must utilize the administrative remedy which limits
actual and punitive damages.
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statute creating the remedy, the remedy has been deemed elective.
152
Where a remedy is elective the plaintiff can choose between the statutory
and the common law remedy.
53
In Rojo v. Kliger,154 the California Supreme Court decided that the
FEHA did not preempt the public policy exception when an employee was
discharged contrary to the public policy discouraging sex discrimi-
nation.155 In Rojo, the plaintiffs were forced to leave their employment
because they were sexually harassed by the defendant employer.'56 The
plaintiffs filed a civil action against the employer claiming wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy." 7 The defendants argued that the
wrongful termination claim was preempted by the FEHA.' 58  The
California Supreme Court disagreed. 5 9 The supreme court held that the
FEHA did not preempt common law actions such as the public policy
exception because the Legislature intended to supplement existing law with
the FEHA, not supplant it.' 60 In particular, the court held that a public
policy exception is not preempted by the FEHA where the public policy
existed prior to the FEHA, such as discouraging sex discrimination.
161
However, the court refused to address whether a wrongful discharge action
based on public policy not existing at common law was preempted by the
FEHA since such action was not at issue.' 62 In addition to arguing that
the public policy wrongful discharge claim is preempted by the FEHA,
employers have argued that the public policy exception is also preempted
by the Workers' Compensation Act. 63
152. Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 79, 801 P.2d at 381, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
153. Id. at 82, 801 P.2d at 383, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 140; see Gantt, 234 Cal. App. 3d at 636, 265 Cal. Rptr.
at 828 (3d Dist. 1990) (stating that whether preemption occurs depends on when the right in question was
established (quoting 3 Bernard E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Actions § 8 (3d ed. 1985)).
154. 52 Cal. 3d 65, 801 P.2d 373, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1990).
155. Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 70, 801 P.2d 373, 375, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 132 (1990).
156. Id. at 71, 801 P.2d at 375, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
157. Id. Plaintiffs also alleged assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
158. Id. at 73, 801 P.2d at 376, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
159. Id. at 89, 801 P.2d at 388, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
160. Id. at 73-76, 801 P.2d at 377-78, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 134-35; see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West
Supp. 1993) (providing that nothing in the FEHA is to be construed as repealing California law relating to
discrimination by race, color, religious creed, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability,
medical condition, marital status, sex or age).
161. Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 82, 801 P.2d at 383, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
162. Id. at 84 n.10, 801 P.2d at 383 n.10, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 140 n.10. For a detailed description of the law
prior to Rojo, see Oppenheimer & Baumgartner, supra note 31.
163. See infra note 170 (citing cases where the employer has claimed that a wrongful termination claim
is preempted by the WCA).
130
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4. Workers' Compensation Preemption of the Public Policy
Exception
Like the FEHA, the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA)' 64 has been
used by employers to challenge the scope of the public policy
exception. 16s The WCA provides that when certain statutory conditions
are met, the WCA shall be the sole and exclusive remedy against the
employer for injuries arising during employment.1' The conditions for
compensation require that there be an employer and employee, that the
injury have arisen during the course of employment and that the injury
have been proximately caused by the employment. 67 However, there is
no compensation when the injury results from the employee's intoxication,
intentional self-infliction, willful or deliberate action, employee initiated
altercation or felonious act.168 In addition, the system of compensation
is a no fault system since compensation does not depend on the negligence
of the employer or employee. 169 Employers prefer compensation under
the WCA compared to the public policy exception because recovery is
limited by the WCA, unlike a tort action under which an employer could
be subject to undefined, almost limitless judgment. 7 °
164. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3200 (West Supp. 1992) (providing for the establishment of the worker's
compensation system). California's Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) was established in 1911. See Roseberry
Act, Cal. Stat. 1911 ch. 399 p. 376 (establishing the workers' compensation system in California). See generally
ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 5.20, at 2-14 to 2-17 (1992) (providing a detailed history
of the worker's compensation system in America).
165. See Shoemaker v. Meyers, 52 Cal. 3d 1, 23, 801 P.2d 1054, 1068, 276 Cal. Rptr. 303. 317 (1991)
(remanding the issue of whether an employee's wrongful discharge claim based on the public policy exception
is preempted by the WCA). See generally Laura Quackenbush, Note, Workers' Compensation Exclusivity and
Wrongful Termination Tort Damages: An Injurious Tug of War?, 39 HASTINGS LJ. 1229 (1988) (discussing
preemption of wrongful discharge suits by the WCA).
166. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601(a) (West 1992) (providing that compensation under the WCA is to be
an exclusive remedy). See generally LARSON, supra note 164, § 2.20 (discussing the underlying rationale for
the workers' compensation system).
167. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600(a)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1993).
168. IdU § 3600(a)(4)-(8) (West Supp. 1993).
169. Id
170. See Shoemaker v. Meyers, 52 Cal. 3d 1, 23, 801 P.2d 1054, 1067-68, 276 Cal. Rptr. 303, 316-17
(1990) (noting that the plaintiff argued that a public policy cause of action could be found despite the exclusive
remedy provisions of the WCA); see also Ortiz v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Say., 824 F.2d 692, 695-96
(9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a wrongful discharge claim based on the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing was not preempted by the WCA); Green v. City of Oceanside, 194 Cal. App. 3d 212, 225, 239 Cal. Rptr.
470, 477 (4th Dist. 1987) (upholding an emotional damage award for wrongful termination because there was
no WCA preemption of the claim). The WCA compensates the injured employee for reasonable medical and
legal expenses and a percentage of the employee's lost wages. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 4600,4621, 4650-4663
(West 1988 and West Supp. 1993). The compensation payment, unlike tort damages, is not intended to make
the injured employee whole, but to prevent the employee from going on welfare while disabled. WARREN
HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.05(5)(a), at 1-29 (2d
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The WCA creates what the California Supreme Court calls the
compensation bargain, which is triggered when the employment
relationship begins.17' This bargain is central to determining whether a
cause of action is preempted by the WCA exclusive remedy provision.
72
The compensation bargain contains two elements: (1) The employer agrees
to liability for injury or death of the employee, regardless of fault, in
exchange for limited liability;173 and, (2) the employee must forgo the
right to a larger recovery under civil litigation, while gaining quick and
certain compensation for injuries. 174  Thus, if compensating an injury
would not effectuate the compensation bargain under the WCA, then the
exclusive remedy provision is not invoked and a plaintiff can recover tort
damages under the public policy exception. 75
The California Supreme Court was first presented with the issue of
whether the WCA preempted the public policy exception in the case of
Shoemaker v. Meyers. 76  Shoemaker was an investigator for the
Department of Health Services. 177 In 1981, he was falsely identified by
a psychiatrist as having harassed a doctor during an investigation.'78
Shoemaker was subsequently interrogated by his supervisors. 179 When
Shoemaker asked for counsel he was fired for insubordination by Meyers,
the Director of Health Services. 80 Shoemaker thereafter filed suit for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.' The trial court
ed. 1987).
171. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 16, 801 P.2d at 1062, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
172. See id. (stating that the function of the exclusive remedy provision is to give force to the
compensation bargain).
173. See supra note 170 (discussing the limits on workers' compensation payments).
174. Ld.; Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 158, 729 P.2d 743, 749, 233 Cal. Rptr.
308, 314 (1987).
175. See infra notes 185-191 and accompanying text (explaining in more detail when the compensation
bargain will not be effectuated by a cause of action).
176. 52 Cal. 3d 1, 801 P.2d 1054, 276 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1990).
177. Shoemaker v. Meyers, 52 Cal. 3d 1, 7-8, 801 P.2d 1054, 1057, 276 Cal. Rptr. 303, 306 (1990).
178. Id. at 8, 801 P.2d at 1057, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
179. Id&
180. Id. Shoemaker alleged that the termination was also in retaliation for previous problems arising from
a 1979 investigation. Id. at 9, 801 P.2d at 1058, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 307. In 1979, Shoemaker was assigned to
investigate allegations that health centers were illegally allowing services to be performed by non-licensed
medical professionals. Id. at 7-8, 801 P.2d at 1057, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 306. After investigation, Shoemaker filed
a report confirming such allegations and stating that Meyers, the Director of the Department of Health Services,
knew of such illegal practices. Id. Shoemaker's investigation was then interfered with by Shoemaker's immediate
supervisor, Charles Shuttleworth. Id. at 8. 801 P.2d at 1057, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 306. After Shoemaker complained
to his supervisor, he was given disciplinary counseling, was harassed and was threatened. Id. In 1981, a
magazine article appeared regarding the illegal activities of health centers and implicated Meyers. Id.
Shuttleworth threatened Shoemaker and other investigators with discharge if no one confessed to the leak. Id.
181. Id.
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sustained Meyers' demurrer on the ground that the wrongful discharge
cause of action was preempted by the WCA. 1s2
On appeal, the California Supreme Court stated that the act of
termination necessarily arises out of the employment relationship and thus,
meets the compensation requirements of the WCA and is compensable
under the WCA. 18 3 The court found no way to distinguish an injury
resulting from wrongful termination as opposed to post-termination,
184
demotion and transfer injuries which were construed as arising out of
employment." 5 However, the court declined to resolve whether all
wrongful discharge claims were preempted by the WCA because not all
claims would effectuate the compensation bargain.'86
The court noted that there are two instances when the exclusive remedy
provisions are not applicable because the compensation bargain is not
furthered, in which case a plaintiff can recover civil remedies for wrongful
discharge. 87 First, the court in Shoemaker noted that the exclusive
remedy provision is not applicable without the existence of a personal
injury 88 sustained during the course of employment.'89 The court noted
that defamation 9" exemplified a non-WCA injury since it does not
involve physical injury or death and is not anticipated in an employment
relationship.' 9' Second, the Shoemaker court stated that the WCA is not
182. Il at 10, 801 P.2d at 1058, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
183. Id. at 19-20, 801 P.2d at 1065,276 Cal. Rptr. at 314; see CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West Supp. 1993)
(providing for compensation without regard to negligence where the employee is injured in the course of
employment and all conditions for compensation are met); see also supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text
(setting out the conditions for workers' compensation).
184. Post-termination injuries are those injuries occurring after the employment relationship has been
terminated. See Mitchell v. Hizer, 73 Cal. App. 3d 499, 506-07, 140 Cal. Rptr. 790, 794 (1st Dist. 1977) (stating
that the employee was injured after discharge when retrieving tools from the employer's premises); Argonaut
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 221 Cal. App. 2d 140, 141-42, 34 Cal. Rptr. 206, 207 (5th Dist. 1963)
(noting that the employee was injured after termination while picking up a final paycheck); Peterson v. Moran,
111 Cal. App. 2d 766, 767-68, 245 P.2d 540, 540 (2d Dist. 1952) (noting that the employee was injured when
he remained at the workplace after being terminated to discuss the reasons for termination).
185. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 18-21, 801 P.2d at 1064-65, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 313-14.
186. l at 21, 801 P.2d at 1065, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 314; see id at 23, 801 P.2d at 1067-68, 276 Cal. Rptr.
at 316-17 (refraining from deciding whether the public policy exception is preempted by the WCA).
187. l at 16, 801 P.2d at 1062-63, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 311-12.
188. A compensable injury is one causing disability or need for medical treatment and is therefore an
injury to the person and not property. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of L.A. v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. App. 3d 1273,
1284, 286 Cal. Rptr. 855, 860 (4th Dist. 1991).
189. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 16, 801 P.2d at 1062-63, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 311-12.
190. Defamation is defined as a statement which exposes a person to contempt, hatred, ridicule or obloquy.
McGowen v. Prentice, 341 So. 2d 55, 57 (La. App. 1977).
191. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 16, 801 P.2d at 1062-63, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 312; see Howland v. Balma, 143
Cal. App. 3d 899, 902, 192 Cal. Rptr. 286, 287 (3d Dist. 1983) (holding that an employee's defamation claim
against the employer is not preempted by the WCA).
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the exclusive remedy where the employer's conduct either cannot be
defined as stemming from a risk reasonably contained in the compensation
bargain, or has a dubious connection to the employment.' 92 For example,
an employer who fraudulently conceals from the employee and the
employee's doctors that the employee had been working in hazardous
conditions which caused the employee's disease would be acting in a
manner not reasonably contained in the compensation bargain.' 93
However, the court in Shoemaker did not decide whether the public policy
exception is contemplated within the compensation bargain and thus,
preempted by the WCA, or whether an employee can proceed in a civil
case for wrongful discharge.'94 The California Supreme Court was again
presented with the issue of whether the public policy exception is
preempted by the WCA in Gantt v. Sentry Insurance.'95 Additionally, the
court was afforded the opportunity to resolve the debate over appropriate
sources of public policy.'96
II. THE CASE
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Vincent Gantt was a sales manager for Sentry Insurance Company's
Sacramento office.197 Gantt supervised Joyce Bruno, who was a liaison
between trade associations and Sentry's Sacramento office. 8 Shortly
after being hired, Ms. Bruno approached Gantt regarding the sexual
harassment she was experiencing from Gantt's co-supervisor. 9 Gantt
reported the problem to his supervisors in the Scottsdale, Arizona regional
192. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 16, 801 P.2d at 1063, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
193. See Johns-Manville Prod. Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465,477, 612 P.2d 948, 955, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 858, 865 (1980) (holding that the employee could sustain an action in damages which was not preempted
by the WCA where he had been fraudulently induced by his employer to continue to work in an environment
exposing plaintiff to asbestos).
194. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 23, 801 P.2d at 1068, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
195. 1 Cal. 4th 1083, 1098, 824 P.2d 680, 689, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874, 883 (1992).
196. Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, I Cal. 4th 1083, 1098, 824 P.2d 680, 689,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874, 883 (1992).
197. Id at 1087, 824 P.2d at 682,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 876. Gantt was hired to develop the Sacramento sales
force. Id. Conflicting evidence was presented at trial regarding how successful Gantt was in developing the sales
force. Id However, the court found the jury had enough evidence to find that Gantt was terminated for illegal
reasons. Id
198. Id Ms. Bruno was also hired as a liaison for Sentry's Walnut Creek office. Id. In addition to
reporting to Gantt, Ms. Bruno also reported to Gary Desser, the manager of the Walnut Creek office, and Brian
Cullen, a supervisor at Sentry's regional headquarters in Scottsdale, Arizona. Id
199. Id Ms. Bruno alleged that Desser was sexually harassing her. Id
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office." ° When Ms. Bruno continued to be harassed, Gantt brought the
situation to the attention of his supervisors for a second time.2"'
Thereafter, Ms. Bruno was transferred and eventually fired.20 2 Gantt was
ridiculed by his immediate supervisor for supporting Ms. Bruno. 03
Ms. Bruno filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment
and Housing (DFEH) regarding her sexual harassment.204 During the
DFEH investigation, Sentry's in-house counsel, Caroline Fibrance,
pressured Gantt to deny he had informed the regional office of the sexual
harassment problem.20 5 When he refused, Sentry decreased Gantt's yearly
performance rating.2' After the investigation, Gantt was demoted to
sales representative and told that he would not be given a book of existing
accounts to start his new job.207 Not having this book made it impossible
for Gantt to work.20 8 As a result, Gantt was forced to quit.2 9
Gantt brought suit against Sentry claiming tortious discharge in
contravention of public policy. 210 The jury awarded Gantt $1.34 million
for his claim. 21' The California District Court of Appeal for the Third
District noted that Gantt's wrongful discharge claim rested on two different
public policies. 212 First, the court found that Gantt was constructively
discharged in retaliation for supporting a coworker's sexual harassment
200. Id. Gantt also reported the problem to his immediate supervisor, Dave Berg. Id.
201. IU Desser was finally demoted and replaced with Robert Warren. Id.
202. Id. Ms. Bruno was fired a few months after Gantt's final complaint. IL
203. Id. Gantt was present at the meeting in which Berg directed Warren to fire Ms. Bruno and Gantt was
ridiculed for supporting her. Id. Berg was then replaced with Frank Singer, who was allegedly told to get rid
of Gantt, although Singer refrained. Id. at 1087-88, 824 P.2d at 682, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 876.
204. Id. at 1088, 824 P.2d at 682, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 876. In addition to sexual harassment, Ms. Bruno
alleged that Sentry's higher management failed to act on her complaints. Id. Sentry's in-house counsel, Caroline
Fibrance, was assigned to investigate Ms. Bruno's complaints. Id.
205. Id. Gantt was also told that Singer and others in the company did not care for him. Ua.
206. Id. Because Gantt felt uneasy about Fibrance, he arranged to meet secretly with John Thompson, the
DFEH investigator. Id. at 1088, 824 P.2d at 683, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 877. Thompson assured Gantt that he would
be protected from retaliation if he told the truth. Id
207. Id. at 1089, 824 P.2d at 683, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 877. Gantt's new supervisor, Neil Whitman,
threatened to fire Gantt if Gantt undermined Whitman's authority. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1086, 824 P.2d at 681, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 875; see Garcia v. Rockwell Int'l, 187 Cal. App. 3d
1556, 1562, 232 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493 (4th Dist. 1987) (holding that a plaintiff does not have to be discharged
to state a wrongful discharge cause of action under the public policy exception); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 178, 610 P.2d 1330, 1337, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839. 846 (1980) (holding that an employee has
a cause of action when discharged in violation of public policy); see also supra notes 106-122 and
accompanying text (discussing the holding in Tameny).
211. Gann, I Cal. 4th at 1086, 824 P.2d at 681, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 875. Specifically, the jury found that
Gantt was discharged for refusing to testify untruthfully to the DFEH and in retaliation for supporting Ms.
Bruno's sexual harassment claim. Id. at 1089, 824 P.2d at 683, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 877.
212. Id. at 1089, 824 P.2d at 683, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 877.
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claim.213 However, the court found that the Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA) protects against termination when an employee aides
a coworker's harassment claim. 214 Thus, Gantt's first claim of wrongful
discharge based on the public policy exception was considered preempted
by the FEHA.1 5 Second, the court of appeal noted that Gantt was
discharged for refusing to withhold information from a public agency
investigating the sexual harassment charges.216 The court held that the
FEHA included a public policy prohibiting termination for complying with
a FEHA investigation.2 7 Yet, the court held this claim was not
preempted because such a policy existed prior to the FEHA.2Is Finally,
because a violation of public policy is not anticipated within the WCA
compensation bargain the court held that the public policy exception was
not preempted by the WCA.219
Subsequently, the California Supreme Court granted review to
determine whether an employee who was terminated in retaliation for
supporting a coworker's claim of sexual harassment and for refusing to
interfere with a state investigation may state a wrongful discharge action
under the public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine.220
In addition, the Gantt court granted review to decide whether the exclusive
remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act bar a wrongful
discharge claim based on public policy.
22'
213. Id.; see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(0 (West Supp. 1993) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee
who opposes practices forbidden by the FEHA or assists another in filing a complaint under the FEHA).
214. Gantt, I Cal. 4th at 1086, 824 P.2d at 681, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 875; see Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 234 Cal.
App. 3d 612, 637, 265 Cal. Rptr. 814, 830 (3d Dist. 1990) superseded by Gantt v. Sentry Ins., I Cal. 4th 1083,
824 P.2d 680, 4 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1992) (finding that the prohibition of retaliation for assisting in a DFEH
complaint established in Government Code § 12940(0 did not exist at common law and thus is preempted by
the FEHA).
215. See supra notes 150-153 and accompanying text (discussing the theory of the California District Court
of Appeal for the Second District stating that the public policy exception will be preempted by the FEHA if the
public policy is based on a FEHA policy not existing before 1959).
216. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1086, 824 P.2d at 681, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 875; see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12975
(West 1992) (providing that any person who resists, prevents, impedes or interferes with the duties of members
of the DFEH or the FEHA as they relate to employment discrimination is guilty of a misdemeanor).
217. Gantt, I Cal. 4th at 1086, 824 P.2d at 681, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 875.
218. Id.
219. Id.; see supra notes 171-175 and accompanying text (defining the compensation bargain).
220. Gantt, I Cal. 4th at 1085, 824 P.2d at 681, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 875.
221. Id.
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B. The Majority Opinion
In an opinion by Justice Arabian, the California Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal for the Third District, holding
that Gantt had established a cause of action based on violation of public
policy and that such action was not preempted by the WCA.222  In
upholding Gantt's verdict, the court first attempted to resolve whether the
existence of public policy could be established from non-legislative sources
or whether public policy was restricted to statutory or constitutional
provisions.223 The court reasoned that limiting public policy to legislative
sources struck a proper balance in the labor market.22 '4 Next, the court
addressed whether Gantt had established a cause of action under the public
policy exception.2" Finally, the court confronted the issue of whether the
public policy exception was preempted by the WCA, given the fact that
behavior violating public policy is not ordinarily a part of the employment
relationship.226
1. Limiting Public Policy to the Legislature's Perceptions
The Gantt court began by articulating a new rule to determine the
existence of fundamental public policies in wrongful termination cases.2 7
In Foley, the California Supreme Court had suggested that an analogy
could be drawn between public policy in illegal contracts and public policy
in wrongful discharge cases.228 Thus, Gantt argued that because courts
in contract law do not restrict themselves to finding public policy in
statutes or constitutions when invalidating contracts, courts should not be
222. Id at 1087, 824 P.2d at 682, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 876. Justice Arabian was joined by Chief Justice
Lucas and Justices Panelli, Baxter and George. Id. Justices Kennard and Mosk concurred in part and dissented
in part. AL at 1101, 824 P.2d at 692, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886.
223. Id. at 1089-95, 824 P.2d at 683-88, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 877-82; see supra notes 14-27 and 115-122
and accompanying text (discussing the debate surrounding appropriate sources of public policy).
224. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1095, 824 P.2d at 687-88, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881-82; see supra notes 21-24 and
accompanying text (noting that some courts argue that legislative sources strike a balance between employer,
employee and societal interests).
225. Gantt, I Cal. 4th at 1096-97, 824 P.2d at 689, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 883.
226. ld at 1100-1101, 824 P.2d at 691-92, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 885-86; see supra notes 164-194 and
accompanying text (discussing WCA preemption).
227. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1095, 824 P.2d at 687-88, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881-82.
228. Idt at 1094, 824 P.2d at 687, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881 (citing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.
3d 654, 667 n.7, 765 P.2d 373, 377 n.7, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 215, n.7 (1988)); see Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 667, 670
nn.7 & 12,765 P.2d at 377, 380 nn.7 & 12, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 215, 218 nn.7 & 12 (suggesting that public policy
may be limited to conduct that an employer could not contract for or against); see also supra note 135
(discussing the analogy between illegal contracts and wrongful discharge).
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so limited in wrongful termination cases.229 The California Supreme
Court conceded that, when holding a contract contrary to public policy,
California courts do not confine their analyses to legislative policy.230 In
fact, Justice Arabian explained that in contract cases courts frequently hold
activities of associations, individuals and corporations as contrary to public
policy in areas where the Legislature has not spoken?23'
Nevertheless, the court observed two principles unrelated to the
contract analogy used in Foley in rejecting Gantt's comparison between
public policy in contracts and wrongful discharge claims.232 The first
principle was that almost all successful causes of action under the public
policy exception are based on a legislative public policy.2 33 The court
also argued that the public policy exception would be a stronger cause of
action for employees if the difficulty in defining public policy was
limited.23
First, most wrongful discharge cases stated under the public policy
exception in California and elsewhere have relied on some statutorily or
constitutionally defined public policy.235 Indeed, the court recognized that
public policy cases fall into one of four categories: (1) Refusing to violate
a statute; (2) performing a statutory obligation; (3) exercising a statutory
right; or (4) reporting an alleged violation of a statute of public
importance. 236  Since all jurisdictions require the plaintiff to plead a
clearly defined and well established public policy,237 and courts are
uncomfortable defining public policy without some direction from the
Legislature, the successful public policy cases have tended to fall into one
229. Gantt, I Cal. 4th at 1093, 824 P.2d at 686, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 880. Gantt was likely relying on Foley
dicta for the analogy between illegal contracts and the public policy exception. See supra note 135 and
accompanying text (discussing how the California Supreme Court in Foley drew an analogy between the public
policy exception and illegal contracts).
230. Gantt, I Cal. 4th at 1093-94, 824 P.2d at 686-87, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 880-81.
231. Id. at 1093, 824 P.2d at 686, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 880; see Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp.,
710 P.2d 1025, 1033 (Ariz. 1985) (noting that courts have traditionally been policy makers, although with the
Legislature as their restraint); Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 567, 574, 261 P.2d 721,
725 (1953) (noting that many state courts do not confine themselves to legislatively defined public policy).
232. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1094-95, 824 P.2d at 687, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881. The court implied that the
difficulty of defining public policy was more important than an analogy to how illegal contracts were treated
by the courts, thereby finding that their observations outweighed the strength of the analogy. See id. (pointing
out that while the analogy to contracts is persuasive, such analogy does not make public policy any easier to
define).
233. Ud at 1094, 824 P.2d at 687, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881.
234. d
235. Id
236. l at 1090-91, 824 P.2d at 684, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 878.
237. See supra notes 131-134 and accompanying text (discussing the Foley requirement that a public
policy be substantial and well established at the time the employer discharges the employee).
1993 / Gantt v. Sentry Insurance
of the above categories.238 Thus, because all four categories involve
statutory provisions, the court found that little would be lost by stating a
new rule that limits wrongful discharge claims to statutory or constitutional
public policies.29
Second, the court recognized that public policy is difficult to define
and that its definition can be influenced by a judge's personal
predilections, which make public policy unpredictable.240 The court noted
that by limiting public policy to statutes and constitutional provisions, the
public policy exception will become clearer. 24' Furthermore, the court
asserted that the formulation of public policy should not be a task of the
judiciary, but rather a task for the Legislature.242
Justice Arabian found that the two principles properly balanced the
interests of employers, employees and society. 243 In particular, while
employers are bound to know the public policy articulated by the
Legislature, the court found that under this new rule, employer termination
decisions would be protected from the unfair surprise of violating an
unknown public policy since employers would not be bound by public
policies articulated by the executive or judicial branch.2" The court also
posited that employees will remain sufficiently protected from public
policy violations and that society will be ensured that its public policies,
articulated through its representatives, will be effectuated.2 45
Thus, the majority chose to avoid the difficulties of the public policy
debate, and instead drew a bright line restricting the public policy
exception by requiring a statutory or constitutional basis for the public
policy.246 As the court pointed out, the narrow definition of public
policy, limited to statutory or constitutional sources only, has been the
preference of a substantial minority of the courts that have addressed the
238. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1090-95, 824 P.2d at 684-87, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 878-81; see supra note 20
(explaining why courts are reluctant to define public policy on their own).
239. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1095, 824 P.2d at 687-88, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881-82.
240. Id at 1095, 824 P.2d at 687, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881 (citing Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d
290, 297, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 163 (1982)); see supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the ambiguity
in defining public policy).
241. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1095, 824 P.2d at 687, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881.
242. Id
243. 1& at 1095, 824 P.2d at 688, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882; see supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text
(addressing the balance that is struck by following the narrow approach of defining public policy).
244. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1095, 824 P.2d at 688, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882.
245. Id. The court states that society as a whole will also benefit from a stable job market, since discharge
will be limited. Id.
246. Id at 1094-95, 824 P.2d at 687-88, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881-82; see supra note 20 and accompanying
text (discussing the difficulty of defining public policy).
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public policy debate.247 The court then turned to the facts of Gantt to
determine whether Gantt had established a public policy claim within the
court's new definition.
2. Applying the New Rule Limiting Public Policy to Legislative
Sources
In applying the new rule of limiting public policy to legislative sources,
the court noted that there was no need to determine if a public policy
existed since Gantt had plead statutory provisions found in the FEHA in
support of his wrongful discharge claim. 248 Gantt first claimed he was
fired for supporting Ms. Bruno's harassment claim and that Sentry thereby
violated Government Code section 12940(f), which encourages the
resolution of harassment problems.249 The California Supreme Court
ignored this claim because the court found that Gantt's award could be
affirmed on a second public policy ground. Yet, by not addressing
whether Gantt had stated a cause of action based on Government Code
section 12940(f), a provision not existing prior to the FEHA, the court did
not address whether the public policy exception was preempted by the
FEHA statutory remedy scheme."'
Gantt's second public policy argument was that Sentry violated
Government Code section 12975, from which a legislative intent to
prohibit interference with the resolution of employment discrimination
complaints may be implied. 2 Because Sentry had terminated Gantt for
247. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1092, 824 P.2d at 685-86, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 879-80; see supra note 16 (listing
those jurisdictions accepting the narrow definition of public policy).
248. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1095, 824 P.2d at 688, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882; see id. at 1102, 824 P.2d at 692,
4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that the majority's new rule is dicta since
the court was not presented with a non-statutory basis for a public policy claim); see also infra notes 268-291
and accompanying text (discussing Justice Kennard's criticism of the majority's resolution of the public policy
debate).
249. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1095-96, 824 P.2d at 688, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882; see CAL. GOV'T CODE §
12940(0 (West Supp. 1993) (prohibiting an employer from discharging an employee for opposing discriminatory
practices).
250. Gantt, I Cal. 4th at 1095-96, 824 P.2d at 688, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882; see infra notes 252-254 and
accompanying text (noting that the second public policy ground was the statutory prohibition on interfering with
a DFEH investigation).
251. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1086 n.2, 824 P.2d at 681 n.2, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 875 n.2; see supra notes 144-
163 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of preemption by the FEHA); infra notes 320-350 and
accompanying text (addressing whether or not this statutory ground for a public policy claim would preempt the
claim).
252. Gantt, I Cal. 4th at 1096-97, 824 P.2d at 689,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 883; see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12975
fVest 1992) (providing that any person who willfully resists, prevents, impedes or interferes with a DFEH
investigation is guilty of a misdemeanor).
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refusing to thwart the resolution of Ms. Bruno's harassment complaint, the
court found that Sentry had violated the public policy prohibiting
interference with a DFEH investigation.2 3 Subsequently, the court turned
to the issue of whether Gantt's wrongful discharge claim was preempted
by the Workers' Compensation Act."5 4
3. Finding that the Public Policy Exception is Not Preempted by
the Workers' Compensation Act
Sentry Insurance contended that if Gantt's wrongful discharge claim
was not preempted by the exclusive remedy of the FEHA, then the claim
was preempted by the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA), because the
act provides the exclusive remedy for work related injuries, including
wrongful termination.25 The court rejected Sentry's argument on three
bases. 6 First, the court noted that allowing the WCA to preempt the
recently established public policy exception would severely restrict the
cause of action by reducing recovery for wrongful termination under the
exception."5 7 The court refused to so severely restrict the public policy
exception because it would have taken away the only tort remedy available
for wrongful discharge.25 8 Indeed, the court indicated that it would be
unfair to withdraw acceptance of the public policy exception in Gantt,
since the action had been adopted only a few years earlier. 2 9
Second, the court found that the WCA did not provide an exclusive
remedy because the public policy exception comes under one of the
253. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1097, 824 P.2d at 689, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 883.
254. IL; see supra notes 164-194 and accompanying text (discussing WCA preemption).
255. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1098, 824 P.2d at 689-90, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 883-84; see supra notes 166-174
and accompanying text (describing the exclusive remedy provision of the WCA).
256. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1098-1101, 824 P.2d at 690-92, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 884-86.
257. See Gang, 1 Cal. 4th at 1098, 824 P.2d at 690, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 884; Stephen G. Hirsch, Testing
the Reach of Workers' Comp, THE RECORDER, Dec. 2, 1991, at 1 (describing how the pubic policy exception
would be restricted if preempted by the WCA because the exception would lose its appeal for providing tort
damages). An example of how the public policy exception would be restricted if preempted by the WCA would
be a reduction in damages illustrated by one attorney's estimate that Gantt would have recovered $50,000 under
the WCA exclusive remedy, compared to the $1.34 million the jury awarded Gantt under the public policy tort
cause of action. IL; see also supra note 169 and accompanying text (describing why worker's compensation
damages can be less than tort damages).
258. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1098, 824 P.2d at 690, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 884; see supra notes 137-141 and
accompanying text (discussing how the Foley case effectively limited a plaintiff seeking tort damages to a
wrongful discharge action based on a violation of public policy).
259. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1098, 824 P.2d at 690, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 884.
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exceptions to the WCA.260 Citing the rule that a wrongful discharge
injury is compensable under the WCA unless the compensation bargain is
not fulfilled, the court found that a violation of a fundamental public
policy is not reasonably expected in the employment relationship and thus,
does not further the compensation bargain. 261 The court reasoned that the
public policy exception does not vindicate contractual rights but rather
aims at aiding a public interest in preventing employers from conditioning
employment on violations of public policy. 262 Thus, the court held that
the public policy exception is not preempted by the WCA.263
The Gantt court affirmed the trial court's award of $1.34 million to
Gantt based on the theory that Gantt was fired for refusing to interfere
with the DFEH investigation in violation of the public policy in
Government Code section 12975.2 4 The court also found that an
employer's violation of public policy as expressed in the FEHA was not
contemplated in the compensation bargain of the WCA.26 s Thus, the
exclusive remedy provision of the WCA was not invoked and the claim
was not preempted by the WCA remedy. 266 However, by grounding
Gantt's claim on a FEHA provision with common law origin, the court did
not address whether the public policy exception was preempted by the
FEHA 267
260. l at 1100, 824 P.2d at 691,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 885; see Shoemaker v. Meyers, 52 Cal. 3d 1, 16. 801
P.2d 1054, 1062-63, 276 Cal. Rptr. 303, 311-12 (1991) (setting out exceptions to the WCA exclusive remedy
provisions where the injury arises out of the course of employment and where the employer's conduct cannot
be viewed as a risk of employment); see also supra notes 185-191 and accompanying text (discussing the
exceptions to the exclusive remedy provision).
261. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1101, 824 P.2d at 692, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886; see supra notes 170-174 and
accompanying text (discussing the rule regarding preemption by the WCA).
262. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1101, 824 P.2d at 692, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886 (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 667 n.7, 765 P.2d 373, 377 n.7, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 215 n.7 (1988)); see supra notes 90-
140 and accompanying text (detailing the theoretical basis for the public policy exception).
263. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1101, 824 P.2d at 692, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886.
264. IL at 1097, 824 P.2d at 689, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 883; see CAL. GOVT CODE § 12975 (Vest 1992)
(prohibiting interference with a DFEH investigation); Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1097, 824 P.2d at 689, 4 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 883 (stating that California Government Code § 12975 implies a public policy to protect well motivated
employees who truthfully testify about discrimination in the work place since few employees would cooperate
with DFEH investigations if not protected from retaliation).
265. Gantt, I Cal. 4th at 1101, 824 P.2d at 692, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886.
266. IdA; see supra note 174 and accompanying text (noting that if the compensation bargain is not
effectuated by the cause of action, the exclusive remedy provision would not be invoked and the cause of action
would not be preempted by the WCA).
267. Gantt, I Cal. 4th at 1086 n.2, 824 P.2d at 681 n.2,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 875 n.2; see infra notes 319-349
and accompanying text (analyzing how the court should resolve the issue of FEHA preemption).
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C. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kennard
Justice Kennard wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.268 Justice Kennard concurred with the majority decision that Sentry
wrongfully discharged Gantt in contravention of the public policy
expressed in California Government Code section 12975 prohibiting
interference with a DFEH investigation.269 Justice Kennard also agreed
that Gantt's claim was not preempted by the Workers' Compensation Act
(WCA). 270 However, she wrote separately to emphasize that the majority
did not address Gantt's first policy theory stating that Gantt was
discharged for assisting Ms. Bruno in her sexual harassment problem21
According to Justice Kennard, Gantt's case should have been affirmed on
this theory as well as the theory that Sentry fired Gantt for failing to
frustrate the DFEH investigation.27 2 Indeed, several California courts
have upheld wrongful discharge claims when the employee was discharged
for internally reporting illegal activity.273 Thus, Justice Kennard stated
that the majority opinion should not be read to overrule those cases.274
In dissent, Justice Kennard disagreed with the majority's holding
limiting the appropriate sources of public policy for a wrongful discharge
claim to statutes and constitutional provisions.275 First, she pointed out
that the majority did not need to decide whether non-legislative sources
were inappropriate for the public policy exception since Gantt had not
based his claim on a public policy lacking a statutory or constitutional
268. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1101, 824 P.2d at 692, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting). Justice Mask joined in Justice Kennard's concurrence and dissent. Il
269. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1101, 824 P.2d at 692, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1101-02, 824 P.2d at 692, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting); see
supra notes 246-248 and accompanying text (explaining why the majority did not address the issue of whether
Gantt stated a cause of action based on the public policy theory that he was discharged for aiding Ms. Bruno's
sexual harassment complaint).
272. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1101-02, 824 P.2d at 692, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
273. Id.; see Collier v. Superior Court, 228 Cal. App. 3d 1117, 1127, 279 Cal. Rptr. 453, 458 (2d Dist.
1991) (holding that an employee has a wrongful discharge claim when discharged for reporting illegal activity
of co-workers to the employer); Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 299-300, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 165
(lst Dist. 1982) (holding that an employee has a cause of action if discharged for complaining about unsafe work
conditions or practices).
274. Gantt, I Cal. 4th at 1101-02, 824 P.2d at 692, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
275. Id at 1103, 824 P.2d at 693, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 887 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
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basis. 6 Thus, Justice Kennard accused the majority of delivering an
advisory opinion having no binding effect, because the parties had never
presented the issue of public policy sources. 277 Justice Kennard stated
that the issue should instead be resolved when the facts squarely present
the issue of what sources of public policy are appropriate, in order to avoid
an error in judgment such as the court made in this case.278
Second, Justice Kennard disagreed with the court's narrow
interpretation of public policy which restricted public policy to legislative
sources. 279 The scope of public policy, in Justice Kennard's opinion,
should have been broadened to include judicial decisions, executive orders,
administrative regulations and decisions and rules of professional
conduct.280 Indeed, the court had previously relied on common law and
a federal executive department order to find that a labor union could not
discriminate on the basis of race.28' Justice Kennard explained that using
non-legislative public policy sources can provide notice to the employer
and are just as fundamental and substantial as statutes or the
282constitution.
The majority's limitation of public policy to statutes and constitutions,
according to Justice Kennard, presumed that judicial decisions, executive
orders, regulations and ethics codes are not expressions of fundamental
public policy. 28 3 To illustrate the weakness of the majority's rule, Justice
Kennard pointed to the fundamental, well established public policy of
national secuiity and noted that, under the majority opinion, national
276. Id at 1102, 824 P.2d at 692-93, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886-87 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
277. Id. at 1102, 824 P.2d at 693. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 887 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting); see
People ex rel Lynch v. Superior Court, I Cal. 3d 910, 912, 464 P.2d 126, 127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 670, 671 (1970)
(announcing that advisory opinions are not in the function or jurisdiction of the California Supreme Court); see
also CAL CONST. art. VI, § 10 (providing that the California Supreme Court can comment on evidence and
testimony and credibility of witnesses as necessary); id. art. VI, § 11 (permitting the Legislature to allow
appellate courts to take evidence and find facts when the jury trial has been waived or is not a matter of right).
278. See Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1102, 824 P.2d at 693, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 887 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting) (arguing that because the majority issued an advisory opinion the court's analysis was flawed).
279. id. at 1103, 824 P.2d at 693, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 887 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
280. d
281. Id; see James v. Marinship Co., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 734, 155 P.2d 329, 337 (1944) (finding that there
is a public policy against racial discrimination even in the absence of a statute).
282. Gantt, I Cal. 4th at 1103, 824 P.2d at 693, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 887 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting). While not citing Foley v. Interactive Data Corporation directly, Justice Kennard implied that non-
legislative sources of public policy could fit within the Foley guidelines of being fundamental, substantial, and
well known at the time of discharge. Id. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 668-72, 765 P.2d
373, 378-80, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 216-28 (1988); supra notes 130-133 and accompanying text (discussing the
Foley guidelines).
283. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1103, 824 P.2d at 693, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 887 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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security would not suffice for a wrongful discharge cause of action since
there is no legislative proclamation of the policy.284 Justice Kennard
rejected this result of the majority's rule and cited to Verduzco v. General
Dynamics, Convair Division285 as an example of why non-legislative
sources of public policy are appropriate.286 In Verduzco, the employer
did not take precautions to prevent information leaks on a national defense
project and the employee was discharged for complaining.287 The court
in Verduzco, allowed the wrongful discharge claim because there is a
public interest in national security, even though not supported by
statute.288 Hence, Justice Kennard asserted that the result of the
majority's holding would be the dismissal of Verduzco's wrongful
discharge claim because there is no statutory basis for the public policy of
national security.289 This result is unwise, according to Justice Kennard,
because the need for national security, like other public policies, is
fundamental and well known even though lacking a statutory basis.2,°
Thus, Justice Kennard would have affirmed the lower court holding and
left the public policy question for another day.29'
Ill. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
The decision in Gantt v. Sentry Insurance settled the dispute among the
California courts of appeal over valid sources of public policy for a
wrongful discharge cause of action.292 The Gantt holding also relieves
284. Id. at 1104, 824 P.2d at 694, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 888 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
285. 742 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Cal. 1990).
286. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1103, 824 P.2d at 693, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting) (citing Verduzco v. General Dynamics, Convair Div., 742 F. Supp. 559, 562 (S.D. Cal. 1990)).
287. 1d; see Verduzco, 742 F. Supp. at 562 (applying California law and denying summary judgment
because plaintiff stated a violation of public policy even in the absence of a statute).
288. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1103-1104, 824 P.2d at 694, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 888 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting); Verduzco, 742 F. Supp. at 562.
289. Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1103-04, 824 P.2d at 693-94, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 887-88 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
290. l
291. Id at 1102-03, 824 P.2d at 692-93, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 886-87.
292. See id. at 1095, 824 P.2d at 687, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881 (holding that public policy must have a
constitutional or statutory basis); cf. id. at 1102, 824 P.2d at 692-93, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886-87 (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (arguing that the court did not decide the issue because the majority opinion was dicta
on the point of appropriate public policy sources); see also supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing
the conflict in the California courts of appeal public policy sources).
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employer concerns regarding judicial discretion in defining public
policy.293 Yet, it remains unclear what impact limiting public policy to
California statutes and the California constitution will have on wrongful
discharge cases since the overwhelming majority of cases have been based
on statutory or constitutional provisions.294 While the court has decided
that the public policy exception is not preempted by the WCA, it remains
undecided whether a claim can be preempted by the Fair Employment and
Housing Act when the FEHA provision that is based on public policy did
not exist prior to the enactment of the FEHA.2 9
A. The End of the Public Policy Debate is Anti-Climactic
The impact of the rule expounded in Gantt, that public policy can be
found only in legislative enactments, is difficult to ascertain. Justice
Kennard warned that an unknown number of wrongfully discharged
employees will be unable to recover under Gantt because not all public
policies are grounded in statute.296 This warning may be too severe since
most public policies are articulated in statutes. Yet, if courts do not read
Gantt broadly to allow public policy to be inferred from statutes, then
Justice Kennard's prediction will materialize.
293. See Stephen G. Hirsch, Court Sets Limits on Public Policy Suits Brought by Fired Workers; Justices
Clarify When Workers' Camp is Sole Remedy, TiE RECORDER, Feb. 28, 1992, at I (suggesting that California
employers have waited since 1980 for a limit on wrongful discharge suits that would reduce employer liability
and are pleased that suits will not go forward on each judge's perception of public policy); see also supra notes
46-49 and accompanying text (discussing why employers disliked the public policy exception to the employment
at will rule).
294. See Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467,477, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 618 (2d
Dist. 1984) (asserting that no California case had ever found a wrongful discharge claim based on a non-
legislative source). But see Verduzco v. General Dynamics, Convair Div., 742 F. Supp. 559, 562 (S.D. Cal.
1990) (holding that the absence of a statute for the public policy of national security does not warrant the
dismissal of a public policy cause of action under California law).
295. See CAL GOV'T CODE § 12930(e) (West Supp 1993) (providing a forum to receive, investigate and
conciliate complaints of employment discrimination); supra notes 143-162 and accompanying text (discussing
preemption of the public policy exception by the FEHA).
296. See Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1103-04, 824 P.2d at 693-94,4 Cal. Rptr. at 887-88 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting) (arguing that limiting public policy to legislative sources will leave some employees unprotected
from wrongful discharge).
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1. Courts Should Infer Public Policy From Statutes and
Constitutional Provisions
All courts currently agree that when an express statutory provision is
violated, public policy is breached.297 For example, courts have held that
a statute, and therefore public policy, is violated where the plaintiff is
discharged for refusing to commit an illegal act, such as suborning
perjury,"' for asserting a statutory right, such as participating in a
union,299 or for violating a statute, such as interfering with an
administrative investigation." On the other hand, the Gantt rule can be
interpreted as also allowing public policy to be inferred from the language
of a statute."' For instance, there is no statute proclaiming a public
policy of national security, yet the public interest in national security can
be inferred from a statute.30 2 Congress has authorized the Secretary of
Defense to withhold from the public, data with military applications.3 3
By implication, Congress has declared a public policy of national security
which could be used as a basis for a wrongful discharge action.3'4 Thus,
if a court accepts that public policy can be inferred from a statute, the
Gantt rule will have a broader application than if limited to statutory
violations.
297. See Shapiro, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 477, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 618 (requiring that a plaintiff, to show a
violation of public policy, must state that the wrongful discharge was in retaliation for asserting a statutory right
or refusing to perform an illegal act, or that the employer directly violated a statute).
298. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 188-89, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (2d
Dist. 1959); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 118 (West Supp. 1993) (prohibiting a person from knowingly testifying
falsely under oath); supra note 12 and accompanying text (providing an illustrative example of how a statutory
violation is contrary to public policy).
299. WVetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Ass'n, 275 Cal. App. 2d 168, 174-75, 79 Cal. Rptr. 543, 546-47
(1st Dist. 1969); see CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 921-923 (West 1989) (providing that no one shall coerce a person from
joining a union).
300. Gantt, at 1097-98, 824 P.2d at 689,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 883; see CAL. LAB. CODE § 12975 (West Supp.
1993) (prohibiting interference with a DFEH investigation); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834,
840 (Wis. 1983) (limiting the public policy exception to violation of a statute or constitutional provision).
301. See Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 297-98, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 164 (1st Dist. 1982)
(allowing an inference from statutes requiring a safe workplace, that the Legislature has proclaimed a public
policy prohibiting discharge in retaliation for complaining of an unhealthy work environment).
302. See 10 U.S.C. § 130 (1988) (authorizing the Secretary of Defense to withhold data with military
application from the public); Verduzco v. General Dynamics, Convair Div., 742 F. Supp. 559, 562 (S.D. Cal.
1990) (stating that 10 U.S.C § 130 evinces a federal interest in protecting military secrets).
303. 10 U.S.C. § 130 (1988).
304. Verduzco, 742 F. Supp. at 562.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 25
Lower courts, however, are currently split on whether public policy can
be inferred from statute in order for an employee to state a cause of
action.3 5 Those courts that do not accept that public policy can be
inferred from statute should reconsider their position, for their narrow
approach ignores the foundation of the public policy exception as set forth
in Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters.0 6 Whether
public policy is found on the face of a statute or implied from a statute, it
remains true that the particular policy will be undermined if an employer
is allowed to discharge an employee, since it will otherwise encourage the ,
employer's behavior. 30 7  For example, in passing Proposition 103,
California voters declared the public policy that consumers are to be
protected from arbitrary insurance rates and practices, insurance companies
are to be accountable to the insurance commissioner, and insurance is to
be fair, available, and affordable for all Californians.0 8 Suppose an
employer discharged an employee for refusing to artificially inflate case
reserves, which would decrease the company's apparent profitability, in
order to justify higher premium rates to the insurance commissioner.30 9
The employee would find no statutory provision to support a wrongful
discharge claim because no statute actually prohibits the increase of case
reserves. 310 The employee's cause of action should not be dismissed,
however, because a general public policy prohibiting the unnecessary
increase in premiums can be inferred from Proposition 103. 31" As with
305. Compare Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 477, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613,
618 (2d Dist. 1984) (requiring that an employer directly violate a statute before an employee can state a
wrongful discharge action) with Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 298, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 164 (1st
Dist. 1982) (permitting a public policy to be inferred from a statute).
306. See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 189, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (2d
Dist. 1959) (establishing the basic rationale for the public policy exception). The court in Petermann reasoned
that if an employer was violating a public policy by forcing an employee to break a law, such as committing
perjury, then giving an employee a wrongful discharge cause of action would vindicate that public policy. Id.
See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text (discussing the Petermann rationale).
307. Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 189, 344 P.2d at 27.
308. Reduction and Control of Insurance Rates, Initiative Measure Proposition 103 (approved November
8, 1988) codified at CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1861-1861.16 (West Supp. 1993). See Sequoia Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court, 13 Cal. App. 4th 1472, 1481, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 893 (6th Dist. 1993) (stating the legislative purpose
of Proposition 103 (citing California Insurance Code § 1861.01 Historical and Statutory Notes (West Supp.
1993))).
309. This scenario is based on the facts of Sequoia Ins. Co. v. Superior Court. Sequoia, 13 Cal. App. 4th
at 1475-76, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 889-90.
310. See id at 1480-81, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 893 (finding that there is no direct statutory support for the
policy that an insurance company cannot adjust or manipulate case reserves).
311. See Reduction and Control of Insurance Rates, Initiative Measure Proposition 103 (approved
November 8, 1988) codified at CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1861-1861.16 (West Supp. 1993) (proclaiming that
Proposition 103 was to be liberally construed and applied so as to fully promote the underlying purposes); CAL.
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perjury, the policy underlying Proposition 103 would be subverted if
employers were allowed to discharge any employee for refusing to
manipulate numbers to deceive the insurance commissioner and consumers.
Thus, because the reasoning in Petermann is just as relevant where public
policy is inferred from a statute, as where the policy is on the face of the
statute, courts should adopt a broad approach to Gantt's public policy rule.
The California District Court of Appeal for the Sixth District, however,
has recently held that Gantt requires that public policy be apparent on the
face of a statute.312 It is true that the Gantt court held that public policy
is limited to those policies delineated in statute.313 It is also true that the
court's use of the word "delineate" implies more exacting specificity than
merely deriving or inferring public policy from statutes.31 4 Yet, to focus
on one word of the Gantt opinion ignores the overall purpose of the Gantt
rule which is to eliminate surprise to the employer and maintain the
employer's flexibility in employment decisions, while still protecting
employees from wrongful discharge and society from excessive
unemployment. 315 A California employer would hardly be surprised if
told that there is a public policy promoting national security or fair and
reasonable insurance rates. Hence, allowing public policy to be inferred
from statutes does not upset the balance intended by the Gantt court, it
merely closes a loophole through which many employees may fall. This
is especially true when one considers that society also wants the public
policies it articulates through the Legislature to be executed. Thus, courts
should reject a narrow reading of Gantt, as used by the California District
Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit, and also accept public policies
which are inferred from California statutory and constitutional provisions.
INS. CODE § 1861.05 (stating that no rate will be approved by the insurance commissioner if excessive,
inadequate or unfairly discriminatory) (West Supp. 1993). An excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory
rate is determined by whether the rate reflects the insurance company's investment income. Id. As further
evidence of the voters' intent to hold down insurance rates, Proposition 103 also prohibited increased insurance
rates and premiums unless the company was threatened with insolvency. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01(b) (West
Supp. 1993). But see Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805,771 P.2d 1247, 258 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1989)
(holding § 1861.01(b) unconstitutional).
312. Sequoia, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 1481, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 893.
313. Gantt v. Sentry Ins., I Cal. 4th 1083, 1095, 824 P.2d 680, 687-88, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874, 881-82
(1992).
314. See Sequoia, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 1480, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 893 (arguing that the court in Gantt, by
using the word delineate, intended public policy to be directly found on the face of the statute, not inferred from
a statute). Delineate means to describe in detail. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIoNARY 597 (3d ed.
1981)).
315. See Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1095, 824 P.2d at 687-88, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881-82 (arguing that limiting
public policy to legislative enactments balances the interest of employers, employees and society).
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Aside from this debate over whether public policy can be inferred from
statutes or not, the Gantt rule will have little impact on the number of
employees allowed to bring successful wrongful discharge claims.
2. California's Active Legislature Has Tempered the Impact of
Gantt on Employees
At first blush, it seems that the Gantt rule will prevent many
employees from recovering for wrongful discharge by limiting recovery to
discharge in violation of statutorily based public policies. Yet, California's
active Legislature has created a statutory basis for most public policies,
thus mitigating the effect of the Gantt rule on plaintiffs. For instance, some
states have held that codes of professional responsibility are appropriate
sources of public policy, in addition to legislative sources. 316  In
California, however, most of the rules covering ethical attorney conduct
are codified in the Business and Professions Code, thereby giving a
wrongfully discharged attorney a statutory basis for a cause of action.
3 17
To illustrate, if an attorney were fired for refusing to maintain an action
the attorney knew was unjust, the attorney could cite Business and
Professions Code section 6068(c) as public policy that an attorney must
not maintain actions that appear to be illegal or unjust.318 Thus, while the
rule articulated in Gantt is considered narrow by state courts that have
adopted a similar rule, in California the rule will have little effect in
limiting the number of public policies which a plaintiff can use to state a
cause of action.3 t9
316. See Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 871 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that public
policy can be found in professional codes of ethics); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512
(NJ. 1980) (finding that sources such as codes of professional ethics can be appropriate sources of public
policy).
317. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6000 (West Supp. 1993) (establishing the State Bar Act).
318. See id. § 6068(c) (West Supp. 1993) (requiring an attorney to maintain only actions, proceedings or
defenses that appear to the attorney to be legal or just).
319. See Gantt, I Cal. 4th at 1092, 824 P.2d at 685-86, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 879-80 (stating that public
policy must have a legislative foundation); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text (citing those states
that have accepted the solely legislative approach to public policy to limit the breadth of the public policy
exception).
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B. The Public Policy Exception Should Not be Preempted by the Fair
Employment and Housing Act
The remaining unanswered question following Gantt is whether a
wrongful discharge claim based on a public policy created by the FEHA,
is preempted by the FEHA.320 The California Supreme Court held in
Rojo v. Kliger32t that the FEHA does not preempt the public policy
exception where the policy existed at common law.322 The California
District Court of Appeal for the Second District, however, has held that the
FEHA preempts the public policy exception where the policy was created
by the FEHA.323 By upholding Gantt's second claim based on public
policy expressed in Government Code section 12975, having a common
law counterpart in perjury, the court avoided deciding whether Gantt's first
claim based on section 12940(f), with no common law basis,324 was
preempted by the FEHA.3' However, the California Supreme Court will
soon have to address this issue as the Legislature is continually adding to
the list of FEHA public policies.
326
320. See Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1086 n.2, 824 P.2d at 681 n.2, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 875 n.2.
321. 52 Cal. 3d 65, 801 P.2d 373, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1990).
322. See Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 82, 801 P.2d at 383, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 140 (holding the FEHA does not
preempt wrongful discharge claims based on common law public policy); supra notes 153-161 and
accompanying text (discussing the decision in Rojo). See generally Oppenheimer & Baumgartner, supra note
31 (examining in detail preemption of wrongful discharge claims by the FEHA).
323. See Ficalora v. Lockheed Corp., 193 Cal. App. 3d 489, 491-92, 238 Cal. Rptr. 360, 361 (2d Dist.
1987) (holding that where a plaintiff alleges violation of a FEHA public policy not existing prior to the statute's
enactment, the public policy exception is preempted); Strauss v. A.L. Randall Co., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 514,
518-19, 194 Cal. Rptr. 520, 523 (2d Dist. 1983) (stating that a civil action alleging a violation of the public
policy prohibiting age discrimination is preempted because age discrimination was not prohibited prior to the
FEHA). See also supra notes 149-152 and accompanying text (discussing the approach to FEHA preemption
in Ficalora and Strauss). But see Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 82 n.10, 801 P.2d at 383 n.10, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 140 n.10
(expressing no opinion on the holdings of Ficalora or Strauss because the court was not presented with a FEHA
created public policy).
324. See Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 234 Cal. App. 3d 612, 637, 265 Cal. Rptr. 2d 814, 830 (3d Dist. 1990)
superseded by 1 Cal. 4th 1083, 824 P.2d 680,4 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1992) (finding that Government Code § 12940(0
does not have a common law counterpart).
325. Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 1 Cal. 4th 1083, 1086 n.2, 824 P.2d 680, 681 n.2, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874, 875 n.2;
see CAL.. GOV'T CODE § 12975 (West Supp. 1993) (making it a misdemeanor to willfully resist, prevent, impede
or interfere with a DFEH investigation); id. § 12940(0 (West Supp. 1993) (providing that an employer is acting
unlawfully when discharging an employee because the employee opposed practices forbidden under the FEHA,
or the employee testified or assisted in another's complaint against the employer); see also supra notes 246-248
and accompanying text (noting that the court in Gantt did not decide the issue of FEHA preemption of the public
policy exception).
326. For FEHA provisions that likely have no common law or other statutory foundation and would be
preempted by the FEHA under the rationale of Ficalora and Strauss, see, e.g., 1991 Cal. Stat. ch. 462, sec. 4
at 6 (forbidding discharge because an employee exercises the right to family care leave); 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 619,
sec. I at 1703 (prohibiting discharge for refusing to be sterilized); 1972 Cal. Stat. ch. 1144, sec. 1 at 2211
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1. The New Right-Exclusive Remedy Approach is Contrary to
Legislative Intent
The new right-exclusive remedy approach of the California District
Court of Appeal for the Second District is contrary to the legislative intent
of the FEHA; thus, it should not be used in resolving this preemption
issue.327 The essence of the analysis of the California District Court of
Appeal for the Second District is that if the plaintiff is alleging a discharge
in violation of a public policy found in the FEHA, and that public policy
did not exist prior to 1959 when the FEHA's predecessor was enacted,328
then the plaintiffs complaint must be dismissed and the plaintiff may only
recover under the FEHA. 329 Thus, if an employee is wrongfully
discharged on the basis of age, taking family leave330 or complaining of
discriminatory employment practices, the employee will be restricted to
those remedies available under the FEHA.33t
Forcing an employee to recover under the FEHA because an employer
violated a FEHA provision enacted after 1959 is contrary to the legislative
purpose of the FEHA as discussed in Rojo v. Kliger.32 The court in Rojo
stated that the California Legislature intended the FEHA to supplement
existing antidiscrimination remedies so as to give employees the maximum
(banning discharge based on age); 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 121, sec. 1 at 2002 (prohibiting discharge in retaliation
for opposing certain unlawful employment practices).
327. See Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 79, 801 P.2d at 381, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 138 (referring to the approach of the
California District Court of Appeal for the Second District as the "new right-exclusive remedy" rule of statutory
construction); supra notes 149-152 and accompanying text (discussing the approach of the California District
Court of Appeal for the Second District); infra notes 330-333 and accompanying text (detailing the legislative
intent of the Legislature when enacting FEHA).
328. Fair Employment Practices Act, 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 121, sec. I at 1999-2005; see Oppenheimer &
Baumgartner, supra note 31, at 153-55 (detailing the history of the FEHA and its predecessor, the Fair
Employment Practices Commission).
329. See supra notes 149-152 and accompanying text (explaining that under the rationale of the California
District Court of Appeal for the Second District a plaintiff cannot state a tort cause of action).
330. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2(b)(3) (Vest Supp. 1993) (defining family care leave as taking leave
to care for the employee's child or to care for a parent or spouse with a serious health condition).
331. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(0 (West Supp. 1993) (prohibiting discharge in retaliation for
opposing unlawful employment practices); id. § 12941(a) (West 1992) (banning discharge based on age); id. §
12945.2(j) (West Supp. 1993) (prohibiting discharge when an employee takes leave to care for a sick family
member); see also supra note 132 and accompanying text (describing the remedies available under the FEHA).
Oppenheimer and Baumgartner argue that this approach is proper. Oppenheimer & Baumgartner, supra note 29,
at 181-82.
332. 52 Cal. 3d 65, 801 P.2d 373, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1990); see id. at 72-82, 801 P.2d at 376-83, 276
Cal. Rptr. at 133.40 (discussing the legislative intent of the FEHA in detail); supra notes 153-161 and
accompanying text (discussing the reasoning in Rojo).
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opportunity to vindicate their civil rights.333 The Rojo court also found
that, under the FEHA, employees can freely seek relief for employment
discrimination injuries under any state law, without constraints.3 4 Thus,
the court reasoned that common law actions, such as the public policy
exception, would not be supplemented as intended, if employees were
forced to seek a remedy for wrongful discharge solely under the
FEHA.335 Instead, the employee's opportunity to seek punitive damages
and unlimited emotional distress damages would be severely restricted if
the public policy exception were preempted by the FEHA.336 Hence, in
the context of FEHA created rights, if the court follows the approach in
Rojo as stare decisis dictates, the court will find that the FEHA does not
preempt the public policy exception.337  A contrary holding would
abrogate the Legislature's intent.
2. Gantt Supports an Employee's Right to Avoid the FEHA
Remedies for Newly Created Rights
The court's language in Gantt v. Sentry Insurance,338 with respect to
the issue of preemption by the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA),
further supports a holding that the public policy exception is not preempted
by the FEHA, when FEHA created rights are involved.339 In particular,
the Gantt court expressed an unwillingness to limit the public policy
333. Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 74-75, 801 P.2d at 378, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (quoting State Personnel Bd. v. Fair
Employment and Housing Comm'n, 39 Cal. 3d 422, 431, 703 P.2d 354, 359, 217 Cal. Rptr. 16, 21).
334. Id. at 82, 801 P.2d at 383, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 140. The Rojo court stated that nothing in the FEHA
indicates an intent to displace preexisting or alternative remedies for employment discrimination. Id. at 80, 801
P.2d at 382, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
335. See id. at 89, 801 P.2d at 388, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (holding that the public policy exception is not
preempted, when involving pre-FEHA rights, because the Legislature intended to supplement common law
actions, not abrogate them).
336. See Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n, 43 Cal. 3d 1379, 1404, 743 P.2d
1323, 1338, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67, 82 (1987) (holding that punitive damages are not available in an action brought
by the Department of Fair Employment and Housing); supra note 144 and accompanying text (outlining the
remedies available under the FEHA, including the cap on emotional distress damages and no provision for
punitive damages).
337. See Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 82, 89, 801 P.2d at 383, 388, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 140, 145 (holding that the
FEHA does not displace any common law causes of action, including the public policy tort exception, when a
pre-FEHA policy is implicated).
338. 1 Cal. 4th 1083, 824 P.2d 680, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874 (1992).
339. See id. at 1100-01, 824 P.2d at 691-92, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 885-86 (discussing why the WCA does not
preempt the public policy exception); supra notes 252-264 and accompanying text (examining the Gantt court's
reasoning regarding WCA preemption).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 25
exception by forcing an employee to recover under the WCA.34 This
holding is based on the fact that a violation of public policy is so
lamentable that a plaintiff can only truly be compensated by tort
damages.34 ' Thus, the court has opened the door to an argument that
preempting the public policy tort with the limited FEHA remedies would
likewise inappropriately limit the public policy exception by reducing a
plaintiffs potential recovery for egregious conduct.42 This argument is
persuasive, given the fact that the Legislature did not intend for the FEHA
to restrict employee compensation for employer violations of civil
rights.34
3
In addition to the legislative intent previously discussed, the Legislature
also intended that an employee be compensated through specified means
when an employer violates a FEHA created public policy. 3" Thus, one
could argue that, because the Legislature has already contemplated the
appropriate remedy for a violation of FEHA created rights, that the FEHA
is an exclusive remedy scheme like the WCA, and therefore, preempts the
public policy exception. 345 Yet, this conclusion would be erroneous for
two reasons. First, the Gantt court has held that the public policy exception
is not preempted by the exclusive remedy provision of the WCA.346
Indeed, the court found that a violation of a FEHA public policy is so
deplorable that an employee can only be compensated with damages for
340. See Gantt, I Cal. 4th at 1098, 824 P.2d at 690, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 884 (refusing to limit a cause of action
that was recently affirmed by the California Supreme Court); see also supra notes 254-256 (explaining how
VCA preemption of the public policy exception would have limited the doctrine).
341. See Gantt, 1 Cal. 4th at 1100, 824 P.2d at 689, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 885 (noting that discharge contrary
to public policy is not expected within the employment relationship because such a discharge is particularly
egregious); see also supra notes 252-264 and accompanying text (discussing why the Gantt court did not declare
that the WCA preempted the public policy exception).
342. See supra note 145 (specifying the remedies of the FEHA); notes 48-49 (listing some recent wrongful
discharge verdicts under the public policy exception).
343. Rojo v. Kllger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 74-75, 801 P.2d 373, 378, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 135 (quoting State
Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n, 39 Cal. 3d 422, 431, 703 P.2d 354, 359, 217 Cal.
Rptr. 16, 21).
344. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12970 (West Supp. 1993) (providing for reinstatement with or without
backpay, payment of actual damages, emotional distress damages not to exceed $50,000, or prospective relief
from future conduct); supra notes 332-337 and accompanying text (discussing other aspects of the legislative
intent surrounding the FEHA).
345. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 4600, 4621,4650-4663 (West 1988) (setting forth the compensation that an
injured employee is entitled to under the WCA); supra notes 171-175 and accompanying text (explaining how
the WCA is an exclusive remedy scheme for worker injuries during the course of employment).
346. Gantt v. Sentry Ins., I Cal. 4th 1083, 1098-1101, 824 P.2d 680, 690-92, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874, 884-86
(1992).
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emotional distress and punitive reasons. 7 Second, the Legislature has
specifically stated that the WCA is the exclusive remedy for worker
injuries, while the Legislature has failed to give the FEHA similar
status?" 8 Indeed, the Legislature has expressed intent that the FEHA is
not an exclusive remedy for employment discrimination." 9 For example,
a plaintiff can receive unrestricted tort relief under the FEHA if the
employer opts to transfer the administrative proceeding into superior
court.35 Thus, restricting an employee to the FEHA remedies for
violations of post-FEHA rights will prevent an employee from being fully
compensated for truly egregious behavior. This is not the intention of the
Legislature. The public policy exception should not be preempted by the
FEHA, irrespective of the rights implicated, because a contrary holding
would be inimical to the FEHA's legislative intent. It would also be
adverse to the California Supreme Court's acknowledgement that the
public policy exception requires full tort remedies.
CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court, in Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, pared
back the public policy exception to at will employment by restricting the
sources of public policy upon which an employee can state a cause of
action.35' As a result, at will employees seeking redress for wrongful
termination will have to look to statutes or California constitutional
provisions in order to establish that an employer violated a public policy.
The number of employees affected by the Gantt rule will depend on
whether a court is willing to infer public policy from statutes. Indeed,
lower courts should infer public policy from statutes if they are to remain
consistent with the spirit of the public policy exception. The court in Gantt
did not require that public policy be on the face of a statute, but rather that
347. See id. (holding that the limited remedies available under the WCA is insufficient to compensate an
employee terminated in violation of public policy).
348. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3601, 3602 (West Supp. 1992) (stating that the WCA is to be the exclusive
remedy for worker injuries); Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 74-75, 801 P.2d 373, 378, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 135
(noting that the Legislature did not intend for the FEHA to be the exclusive remedy for employment
discrimination (quoting State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n, 39 Cal. 3d 422. 431,
703 P.2d 354, 359, 217 Cal. Rptr. 16, 21)).
349. See supra notes 332-333 and accompanying text (detailing the legislative intent regarding the
exclusivity of the FEHA remedies).
350. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12965(c) (West Supp. 1993) (allowing an employer to transfer a Department
of Fair Employment and Housing action into superior court if the Department is seeking emotional distress
damages and/or administrative fines).
351. See supra notes 227-265 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's decision in Gantt).
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public policy be delineated in statutory provisions. Thus, courts should
look at the purpose of statutory provisions to deduce the public policy the
legislature intended to proffer.
The new right-exclusive remedy approach to the issue of whether the
FEHA preempts the public policy exception may be appropriate for other
statutory remedy schemes, but not for the FEHA. The FEHA was enacted
with the intent to provide employees and employers with an alternative
avenue for resolving civil rights disputes. Indeed, recent statutory
provisions allow the employer to transfer an administrative proceeding to
superior court where the employer is no longer protected by the limits on
compensatory or punitive damages. Thus, the legislature did not intend to
bind employers and employees to the FEHA proceedings and remedies.
Therefore, courts should not use a tool of analysis, such as the new right-
exclusive remedy rule, to undermine this legislative intent. Instead, courts
should hold that the public policy exception is not preempted by the FEHA
remedy scheme.
Laurie A. Erdman
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